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I. INTRODUCTION
Events in Bosnia, combined with the fiftieth anniversary of the
termination of World War II, have renewed interest in the
international prosecution of war crimes. Discussions have centered
on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Control
Council Law No. 10 courts in occupied Germany. Nonetheless,
scant attention has been paid to the plethora of post-war prosecutions
before domestic civil and military tribunals. These trials, in addition
to their historic import, were significant in shaping the humanitarian
law of war. This essay sketches the doctrinal contributions of these
post-World War II domestic tribunals.1
* The author, Matthew Lippman, is a Professor of Law at the University of
Illinois in Chicago, Illinois. He received his Ph.D. at Northwestern University, his
J.D. at American University, and his LL.M. at Harvard University.
1. See generally Matthew Lippman, Conundrums OfArmed Conflict: Criminal
Defenses To Violations Of The Humanitarian Law Of War, 15 DICKINSON L
INT'L L. 1 (1996); Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.L 171 (1997); Matthew Lippman, The Good Motive Defense:
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II. POST-WORLD WAR TWO WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
A. Prosecutorial Models
The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union
pledged on October 30, 1943 that the "major war criminals, whose
offenses have no particular geographical localization . . .will be
punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies."2 In
contrast, those whose crimes were centered in specific territories
were to "be sent back to the countries in which their abominable
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished
according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free
governments which will be created therein." '3
Ernst Von Weizsaecker And The Nazi Ministries Case, 7 TOURO INTL L. REV.
57 (1997); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Prosecutions Of Nazi Health
Professionals And The Protection Of Human Rights, 21 THURGOOD
MARSHALL L. REV. 11 (1995); Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After Auschwitz:
Prosecutions Of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, I1 CONN. J. INT'L L. 191
(1995): Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The Trial Of Nazi Military Leaders, 6
TOURO INT'L L. REV. 261 (1995); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials Of
German Industrialists. The 'Other Schindlers,' 9 TEMPLE J. INT'L & COMP. L.
101 (1995); Matthew Lippman, The Nazi Doctors Trial And The International
Prohibition On Medical Involvement In Torture, 15 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES
INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 395 (1993): Matthew Lippman, They Shoot Lawyers Don 't
They?: Law In The Third Reich And The Global Threat To The Independence Of
The Judiciary, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L. J.257 (1993); Matthew Lippman, The Other
Nuremberg: American Prosecutions Of Nazi War Criminals In Occupied
Germany, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.REV. 1 (1992); Matthew Lippman.
Nuremberg. Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN.. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) ; Matthew
Lippman, Nuremberg 6 LAW IN CONTEXT 28 (1988); Matthew Lippman, The
Denaturahation Of Nazi War Criminals In The Unied States. A Justice Being
Served? 7 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 169 (1985): Matthew Lippman, The Trial Of
Adolf Eichmann And The Protection Of Universal Human Rights Under
International Law, 5 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. I (1982). See generally, Matthew
Lippman, Towards An International Criminal Court, 3 SAN DIEGO IJ. 1 (1995):
Matthew Lippman, Vietnam: A Twenty Year Retrospective, II DICKINSON J.
INT'L L. 325 (1993); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre And
The Vietnam War, I SAN DIEGO J.J. 295 (1993).
2. Declaration On German Atrocities, Oct. 30, 1943, VI DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 231,232 (1945).
3- Id
Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals
Twenty-two major German war criminals were prosecuted
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.' Lower-
level Nazi bureaucrats, diplomats, and militarists were tried in
twelve American trials in occupied Germany.' However, most
accused German war criminals, were prosecuted before courts in the
countries in which they committed their catastrophic deeds.6 Various
prosecutorial' models were utilized. Australia,7 Canada,8 France,9
Great Britain,10 China, and the United States" provided for the trial
4. See Agreement For The Prosecution And Punishment Of The Major War
Criminals Of The European Axis Powers And Charter Of The International
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter]. See also International Military Tribunal For The Far East,
The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Nov., 1948), in II THE LAW OF WAR 1029
(Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal].
5. See Control Council Law No. 10, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 XVII (1952).
6. See infra notes 7-39. The decisions of these various domestic courts
constitute evidence of custom, the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and judicial decisions that provide a subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law. See Statute Of The International Court Of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(a)-(d), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
7. See Australian Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals By Military
Courts, V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 94 (U.N. War Crimes Commn, 1948)
(Annex) [hereinafter Australian Law].
8. See Canadian Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals By Military Courts,
IV L. REPT. TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 125 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)
(Annex)[hereinafter Canadian Law].
9. See French Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals By Military Tribunals
And By Military Government Courts In The French Zone Of Germany, III L.
REPT. TRAIALS WAR CRIM. 93 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Annex II)
[hereinafter French Law].
10. See British Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals By Military Courts, 1
L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 105 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) (Annex
I) [hereinafter British Law].
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of accused war criminals before military courts. The jurisdiction of
British Military Courts was based on a Royal Warrant of June 14,
1945 that confined the tribunals' jurisdiction to violations of the laws
and usages of war committed during any conflict in which His
Majesty has been, or may be engaged, at any time since September
2, 1939. This contrasted with the jurisdiction of the International
Military Tribunal that extended to crimes against humanity and
peace, as well as to war crimes. 3
British Military Courts were comprised of a President and two
officers equal or greater in rank than the accused. The panel
members were not required to possess legal training. Mixed national
panels were appointed in those instances in which one or more of the
victims were drawn from countries other than Great Britain.14 Greek
officers, for example, were named to the tribunal in Peleus, which
involved eighteen Greek victims, 5 while Dutch officers were
included on the panel in Almelo, which concerned a crime
committed on Dutch territory against several victims, one of whom
was from the Netherlands. 16 The Royal Warrant also provided for
11. See Chinese Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals, XIV L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 152 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Annex)
[hereinafter Chinese Law].
12. See United States Law And Practice Concerning Trials Of War Criminals
By Military Commissions And Military Government Courts, I L. REPT. TRIALS
WAR CRIM. 111 (U.N. War Crimes Conm'n, 1947) (Annex I) [hereinafter
United States Law].
13. British Law, supra note 10. A Royal Warrant is based on the Royal
Prerogative of the Crown. Id. See Royal Warrant (Army Order 81/45, June 14th,
1995) quoted and cited in id. See Nuremberg Charter supra note 4, at arts. 6(a) &
(c). France was distinguished from the other countries that relied on military
tribunals in that the French Ordinance incorporated specific provisions of the
French criminal and military criminal codes. French Law, supra note 9, at 95-96.
14. British Law, supra note 10, at 106-08.
15. Trial Of Kapitanleutnant Heinz Eck And Four Others For The Killing Of
Members Of The Crew Of The Greek Steamship Peleus, Sunk On The High Seas
(The Peleus Trial) (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Oct. 17th-20th, 1945), I L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) [hereinafter Peleus].
16. Trial Of Otto Sandrock And Three Others (The Almelo Trial) (Brit. Milit.
Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals
the appointment of a Judge Advocate to impartially advise the Court
on substantive and procedural law and to summarize the evidence.
The evidentiary rules and burden of proof were the same as those
applicable in courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. A petition to
the Confirming Officer was the only appeal that was provided. The
decisions of the British and other low-level military courts do not
constitute binding domestic precedents. Nevertheless, they are
significant declarations of international legal doctrine and State
practice.'
7
The Netherlands utilized a second model--initially prosecuting
war criminals before special criminal courts that applied the existing
criminal code. The Dutch subsequently modified this approach and
incorporated the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions
of the Nuremberg Principles into their domestic legal code. The acts
falling within these categories of criminal conduct were punished in
accordance with analogous provisions of the existing criminal
statute. 8
The Netherlands established five special mixed civilian-
military war criminal courts, as well as a Special Court of Cassation
(Supreme Court). These Courts initially functioned under the
Extraordinary Penal Law Decree of 1943. The preamble noted that
this legislation was enacted to protect "the security of the State...
[which] made it urgently necessary to lay down extraordinary penal
rules [to permit] the trial of certain acts committed during the time of
Ct., Almelo, Holland, Nov. 24th-26th, 1945), I L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
35 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947)[hereinafter Almelo]. A French member was
appointed to the panel in the prosecution of eleven defendants allegedly involved
in the execution of six British and four American prisoners of war and four French
Nationals. Trial Of Karl Buck And Ten Others, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Suppertal,
Germany, May 6th-10th, 1946), V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 39,41 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Buck].
17. British Law, supra note 10, at 106-10. A Judge Advocate must be
appointed in those instances in which the tribunal does not include a legally trained
member. Id at 107.
18. Netherlands Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals, XI L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 86, 102-03 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Annex)
[hereinafter Netherlands Law].
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the present war, which acts were gravely deserving of punishment." 9
This legislation modified existing penal laws so as to permit the
imposition of more severe penalties. Several additional offenses
were incorporated into the legislation, including recruitment for
foreign military service, evasion of conscription, and various
common law crimes committed under the authority of the occupying
authority.20
The Special Court of Cassation, in Ahlbrecht, quashed a
manslaughter conviction under the Extraordinary Penal Law Decree
of 1943. The Court concluded that the Dutch judiciary lacked legal
competence over enemy war criminals, and explained that it was
"unreasonable to try foreign soldiers and officials according to
Netherlands rules which were not written for them, instead of trying
them by those rules written for them which govern warfare."21 In
addition, "several extremely serious violations of the laws of war
could not even be squeezed under the provisions of the Penal
Code. 22
The Netherlands Parliament responded with a 1947 amendment
to the country's war crimes legislation. This punished war crimes
and crimes against humanity as defined in the Nuremberg Charter.
The punishment of these acts remained anchored in Dutch domestic
doctrine--the sentences were to be the maximum established for
19. Extraordinary Penal Law Decree of 22nd December 1943 (Statute Book of
the Kingdom of Netherlands No. D.61) as amended by Statute Book No. H.204 of
27th June, 1947 and Statute Book No. H.233, of 10 July, 1947 quoted and cited in
id at 86.
20. Id at 88.
21. Ahlbrecht, quoted in id. at 89.
22. Id. The Special Court of Cassation noted that "the jurisdiction over
members of the enemy occupying forces on account of a violation of the rules of
war, which the Netherlands derive from international law, has not yet been laid
down in any law such as would be necessary to make the jurisdiction effective.
. the Netherlands judge has, for the time being, no jurisdiction over members
of the enemy armed forces and enemy organizations attached to the same who
violate the laws or customs of war in this country." Id. at 89-90.
Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals
analogous domestic offenses.23
Poland also vested jurisdiction in special criminal courts
consisting of one professional and two lay-judges. In 1946, primary
jurisdiction was transferred to the newly created Supreme National
Tribunal, comprised of a mixed professional and lay panel. Ordinary
criminal courts retained residual jurisdiction over war crimes that
were not prosecuted before the Supreme National Tribunal. Polish
war crimes legislation combined newly adopted articles punishing
acts undertaken by individuals assisting the German State with
existing provisions of the Criminal Code. These provisions were
sufficiently broad to encompass acts constituting war crimes, as well
as crimes against humanity and peace.24
Norway adopted an alternative approach, utilizing the existing
civilian courts and criminal code. County and Town Courts were
provided with jurisdiction over minor war crimes while offenses
punishable by more than five years imprisonment were prosecuted
before a three judge Court of Appeal (Lagmannsrette). The
Norwegian Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction.25
Norwegian war crimes jurisprudence, consistent with
Continental practice, required the prosecution to demonstrate that the
accused's conduct contravened a specific provision of municipal law
that corresponded to a prohibition of the humanitarian law of war.
This contrasted with the practice of Great Britain and other Common
Law countries which directly prosecuted individuals under
international law. 2
6
23. Id at 90-91.
24. Polish Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals, VII L. REPT. TRIALS
WAR CRIM. 82-83, 90 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Annex) [hereinafter
Polish Law].
25. Norwegian Law Concerning Trials Of War Criminals, III L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 81, 85-86 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Annex I)
[hereinafter Norwegian Law].
26. Id. at 82. A United States Military Commission, indicted and subsequently
convicted seven German civilians staff members of a mental institution with a
violation of international law in that they participated in the killing of over 400
Polish and Russian nationals. Trial Of Alfons Klein And Six Others (The Hadamar
Trial), (United States Milit. Comm'n, Wiesbaden, Germany, Oct. 8th-15th, 1945),
1999-20001
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Norwegian courts occasionally experienced difficulty in
calibrating international legal principles with domestic law. The
Ministry of Justice and Police observed that the German economic
exploitation of Norway in the "scale and the forms in which it has
been carried out lie.., so far beyond the usual conception of
criminal law that it is difficult or even impossible to regard the
different acts as ... within the scope of existing provisions of the
Civil or Military Criminal Codes." 7 Courts found it difficult to find
a domestic equivalent to the German occupanfs excessive issue of
currency notes and the unreasonable fixing of prices. The
confiscation of property, requisitioning, imposition of contributions,
illegal imposition of fines, and other forms of illicit economic gain
acquired by force or threat of force, were somewhat awkwardly
punished as the crime of robbery with violence." The Norwegian
Supreme Court's justification in Klinge for disregarding the
constitutional prohibition on retroactive punishment illustrates the
challenge which confronted Continental courts in integrating
international law into the contours of domestic legal doctrine.
Kriminalassistent Karl-Hans Hermann Klinge was indicted and
convicted under the Norwegian criminal code of two counts of the
mistreatment and torture of eighteen Norwegian citizens. Klinge
was subsequently sentenced to death pursuant to the Provisional
Decree of 4 May 1945. He argued that at the time that he had
committed these crimes, they had not been punishable by death and
that his sentence constituted retroactive punishment in violation of
the Norwegian Constitution.29
Klinge's appeal was considered sufficiently significant to merit
a hearing before the full Supreme Court, which upheld his
conviction by a vote of nine-to-four. The majority noted that torture
I L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 46, 53 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947)
(Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Hadamar].
27. Quoted in id. at 84.
28. Id. at 84-85.
29. Trial Of Kriminalassistent Karl-Hans Hermann Klinge, (Eidsivating
Lagmannsrett and Supreme Court of Norway, Dec. 8th, 1945-Feb. 27th, 1946), III
L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 1-2 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)
[hereinafter Klinge].
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violated the laws and customs of war as well as Norwegian law. The
Court held that the punishment provided in the 1945 Decree merely
authorized Norwegian courts to implement Norway's prior
endorsement of the various Allied declarations and agreements to
punish Nazi war criminals--a prerogative which existed under
international law at the moment that Klinge's crimes were
committed."
The Supreme Court observed that the prohibition on retroactive
punishment was intended to insulate the society from oppressive
governmental power. It was "unreasonable . . . to maintain that
provisions made for the protection of the community could be
pleaded by foreign intruders, citizens of a state which had attacked
that same community in order to subdue it, who had used the most
reckless and brutal means to achieve this end."3 Those who drafted
the Constitution could not possibly have intended this. The
Norwegian people certainly would have endorsed the imposition of
capital punishment had they been able to anticipate the atrocities
committed by German occupation forces. The German Third
Reich's occupation, however, prevented "the people's sense of
justice... [from being] given an opportunity to express itself .... "32
The dissent pointed out that only offenses could be punished in
accordance with the legislation that existed at the time of their
commission. International law was not binding on Norwegian courts
until incorporated into the domestic criminal code. The Cabinet in
London had adopted a Provisional Decree in 1942 that enhanced the
punishment of various crimes, but had not found it necessary to
30. ld. at 3-4 (Opinion of Judge Skau).
31. Id at 4.
32. Id at 5. Judge Skau also noted that superior orders could not be pled in
mitigation. Klinge's acts were "severe violations of the 'laws of humanity' ... the
defendant regardless of all German propaganda, could not have been in doubt that
his acts, irrespective of their purpose, not only were to be condemned morally but
were also unlawful." Id at 6. Judge Schjelderup argued that international law had
entered into force as between Norway and Germany when the Third Reich invaded
Norway on April 9, 1940. Klinge thus was subject to the death penalty at the time
that he perpetrated his criminal acts. Id at 10. See also id (opinion of Judge
Larssen).
1999-2000]
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increase the severity of punishment for the types of transgressions
committed by Klinge. The Cabinet believed that past failures could
not be corrected by current contraventions of the constitution. The
constitutional prohibition on retroactive punishment, in the view of
the dissenting judges, was a foundation of Norwegian jurisprudence
that did not vary in accordance with time or circumstance.
Compromising legal principle was a prescription for anarchy--the
excesses born of post-war anger and bitterness could only be
constrained through adherence to the rule of law.33
The French courts also adhered to the Continental approach.
The Court of Appeals rejected the petition of Robert Wagner, former
Gauleiter and Head of the Civil Government of Alsace, determining
that it had been unnecessary to instruct the trial court that it was
required to find that Wagner's violations of French law also
contravened the laws and customs of war. The Court reasoned that
the military courts' foundation instrument clearly stated that the
tribunals were to prosecute defendants for war crimes committed
during the course of World H."34
In sum, major war criminals were prosecuted before
international or occupation courts. Jurisdiction over lower-level Nazi
criminals was variously vested in military, civilian, or specially
created domestic criminal courts. Common law countries that
prosecuted individuals for contravening the code of armed conflict
generally relied on custom and precedent to define the scope of the
humanitarian law of war." On some occasions, these Courts drew
33. Id. at 6-10 (Holmboe, J. dissenting). The issue of retroactive punishment
also was discussed in, Trial Of Hans Albin Rauter, (Netherlands Spec. Ct. The
Hague, May 4th, 1948 And Spec. Ct. Cassation, Jan. 12, 1949), XIV L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 49 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Rauter].
34. Trial Of Robert Wagner, (Perm. Milt. Trib., Strasbourg, Apr. 23rd-May 3d,
1946 and Court Of Appeal, July 24th, 1946), 1I1 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
23, 54 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)(Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Wagner
I]. The Court of Appeal noted that Article I of the Ordinance of 28th August 1944,
"made it clear that the legality of an accused's acts under the laws and customs of
war would render him not guilty of an offense. It was not, therefore necessary to
ask the judges whether this element ofjustification existed." Id. at 54 (Notes on the
Case).
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upon municipal law to supplement the sometimes-shadowy
principles of international law. For instance, in Schonfeld, a British
Military Court utilized the domestic doctrine of accomplice liability
to amplify the scope of culpability for war crimes. The Court
explained that in the absence of an international legislature, it was
appropriate to consult municipal law in order to gain added insight
into the requirements of natural justice.
36
On the other hand, Continental European courts attempted,
with varying degrees of success, to rely on municipal laws,
sanctioning those who contravened existing or newly enacted
provisions of the domestic criminal code, which also constituted
violations of the humanitarian law of war.37 This often frustrated
prosecutions. For instance, a Netherlands Special Court in
Amsterdam acquitted the accused Willy Zuehlke of the international
delict of membership in a criminal organization on the grounds that
the crime had not been incorporated into the domestic criminal
code.3"
The utilization of military or special tribunals served to stress
the extraordinary nature of the defendants' crimes. At the same time,
reliance on the loosely codified humanitarian law of war or special
legislation raised the spectra of retroactive punishment. However,
the utilization of existing criminal codes served to detract from the
seriousness of the crimes committed by German and Japanese
combatants. The issue also arose whether crimes committed during
armed conflict were cognizable under domestic criminal codes.39
35. See supra notes 2-17 and accompanying texts.
36. Trial Of Franz Schonfeld And Nine Others, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Essen, June
1 lth-26th, 1946), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 64, 72 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Schonfeld].
37. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying texts.
38. Trial Of Willy Zuehlke, (Netherlands Spec. Ct., Amsterdam, Aug. 3rd,
1948 and Netherlands Spec. Ct. Of Cassation, Dec. 6th, 1948), XIV L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 139, 141 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter
Zuehlke].
39. The utilization of these various approaches to prosecution was challenged
in Yamashita. The defendant contended that Article 63 of the Geneva Convention
1999-20001
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B. Jurisdiction
The Allied Powers vowed to return war criminals so they could
stand trial before Tribunals in the territories in which their crimes
had been committed. In practice, states whose nationals or interests
had been victimized claimed primary jurisdiction, regardless of the
site of the delict.40 In Gerbsch, the Special Court in Amsterdam
assumed jurisdiction over the prosecution of Wilhelm Gerbsch, a
former guard at a penal camp in Germany, who was alleged to have
beaten and mistreated Dutch inmates as well as inmates of other
nationalities. The Court explained that Gerbsch's acts had harmed
Dutch nationals as well as the national interest of the Netherlands. 1
This extension of State prerogative was consistent with
domestic statutes that provided for extensive jurisdictional claims.
For example, the Norwegian war crimes law extended to enemy
citizens or other aliens who were in enemy service, or under enemy
orders, who were responsible for the commission of war crimes in
Norway or against Norwegian citizens or interests. The statute also
encompassed acts committed abroad to "the prejudice of Allied legal
interests or to interests which . .. are deemed to be equivalent
thereto. 42  The latter was intended to extend jurisdiction to war
required that a prisoner of war must be prosecuted before "the same courts and
according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed
forces of the detaining Power." Geneva Convention Relative To The Treatment Of
Prisoners Of War, July 27, 1929, 47 STAT. 2021, T.S. No. 846, at art. 63
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]. This would guarantee war criminals prosecuted
by the United States the statutory safeguards of the Articles of War, along with the
safeguard contained within the due process clause of the United States
Constitution and the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. See id. at arts. 60-66.
The United States Supreme Court, however, ruled that the statutory context of
Article 63 indicated that the provision pertained to offenses committed by a
prisoner of war while in captivity. The Geneva Convention thus did not address
the prosecution of violations of the law of war committed by combatants during
armed conflict. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1946).
40. See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying texts.
41. Trial Of Wilhelm Gerbsch, (Spec. Ct., Amsterdam April 28th, 1948), XIII
L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 131, 132-33 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949)
(Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Gerbsch].
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crimes committed in Allied countries as well as Denmark.43 Another
example is that Polish law encompassed crimes committed on the
territory of the Polish State, Polish sea, or Polish aircraft, as well as
crimes committed abroad against the welfare or interests of the
Polish State or a Polish citizen. Poland also claimed jurisdiction over
Polish citizens and foreigners charged with specified international
crimes whom were not extradited to a requesting State.44
Domestic war crimes tribunals relied on this type of broad
statutory language to assert jurisdiction in a variety of circumstances.
Australia assumed jurisdiction over crimes committed by the
Japanese against the combatants of other Allied Powers. For
instance, Lieutenant-General Baba Maso was prosecuted before an
Australian military court for crimes against American and British
prisoners of war in Borneo.4 ' British military courts claimed
jurisdiction over offenders whose criminal conduct victimized
nationals of the United Kingdom as well as other countries. In
Peleus, as noted, a British Military Court presided over the
prosecution of five members of a German submarine crew whose
attack against a Greek merchant ship resulted in the death of
nationals from England as well as China, Greece, Poland, and the
Soviet Union.46 A British Military Court, in Buck, prosecuted eleven
German combatants for killing six British and four American
prisoners of war, as well as four French nationals held in Germany.47
42. Norwegian Law, supra note 25, at 83.
43. Id at 84.
44. Polish Law, supra note 24, at 84-85.
45. Trial Of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao (Aust. Milit. Ct., Rabaul, May
28th-June 2nd, 1947), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Masao].
46. Peleus, supra note 15, at 13-14 (Notes on the Case). The British court was
sitting in the British Zone and could claim jurisdiction as an exercise of sovereign
jurisdiction over occupied Germany. Id. at 13.
47. Buck, supra note 16, at 39. A French officer was appointed as a member
of the Court. Id The Polish Supreme National Tribunal asserted jurisdiction over
crimes committed in concentration camps against Polish nationals, the nationals of
1999-20001
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Australian courts also claimed jurisdiction over crimes against the
residents of Australia's South Pacific territories.48
A United States Military Commission, located in Shanghai,
ruled that it was entitled to preside over the prosecution of Lothar
Eisentrager and other German defendants for unlawfully aiding and
assisting the Japanese forces that contested American forces in
China. The Tribunal noted that territorial jurisdiction over common
crimes is based upon the premise that offenders should be prosecuted
in the localities of their crimes. Local jurisdictions ordinarily possess
the greatest interest in punishing these delicts. In contrast, war
crimes constitute an outrage against humanity and may be
prosecuted by any state that is accepted as a member of the
community of nations. The American Commission also ruled that it
was entitled to convene on Chinese territory. American troops had
entered and remained in China at the invitation of the host
government in order to liberate the country from Japanese
oppression. The completion of this mission required the prosecution
and punishment of those who had trampled on the rights of the
Chinese people.4 9
the other countries occupied by Germany, and Soviet Prisoners of War. See Trial
Of Obersturmbannfuehrer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, (Sup. Nat'l Trib.,
Poland, March llth-29th, 1947), VII LAW REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 11
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Hoess].
48. See Trial Of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi And Six Others, (Aust. Milit.
Ct., Rabaul, March 20th-23rd, 1946), V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 25 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Ohashi].
49. Trial Of Lothar Eisentrager And Others, (United States Milit. Comm.,
Shanghai, Oct. 3rd-Jan. 14th, 1947), XIV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 8, 15-
16 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter
Eisentrager]. In Sawada, an American Military Commission sitting in Shanghai
dismissed a challenge to its jurisdiction, citing the inherent power of the United
States forces to prevent and prosecute those responsible for criminal acts against
American prisoners of war, regardless of the status of their crimes. The Tribunal
noted that China had consented to the convening of an American court on Chinese
soil. Trial Of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada And Three Others, (United
States Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, Feb. 27th-April 15th, 1946), V L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 8-10 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Notes on the
Case) [hereinafter Sawada].
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Several courts extended the Eisentrager precedent and
recognized universal jurisdiction over war crimes." A United States
Military Commission, in Hadmar, convicted seven functionaries of a
mental institution in the Reich for killing over four hundred Polish
and Soviet nationals.5 The Commission explained that the United
States possessed a direct interest in punishing crimes against the
nationals of other Allied States. The Tribunal also held that it was
authorized to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction, which provided States the prerogative to punish war
criminals, regardless of the nationality of the victim or the site of the
crime. This principle was based on the outrageous nature of war
crimes, as well as the global interest in insuring that the perpetrators
of such offenses were brought before the bar ofjustice.
The Commission also cited the United States' sovereign
authority within occupied Germany that provided jurisdiction under
both the territorial and personality (nationality of accused)
principles.52 A British Military Court in the Zyklon B case also
recognized universal jurisdiction over acts directed against Allied
nationals.53
Several domestic courts noted that their war crimes jurisdiction
was limited to acts directed by German and other Axis belligerents
against Allied nationals. 4 In the British prosecution of forty-five
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. Hadamar, supra note 26, at 46. The American Tribunal was only authorized
to prosecute war crimes against Allied nationals, and charges of crimes against
humanity were not brought against the accused for the murder of roughly ten
thousand German civilians. Id. at 53.
52. Id at 52-54 (Notes on the Case). The Hadmar decision also established that
United States Military Commissions would hold enemy civilians, as well as
combatants, liable for war crimes. Id
53. Trial Of Bruno Tesch And Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Hamburg, March lst-8th, 1946), 1 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 93, 102-
03 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Zyklon B].
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The Reich's acts against
civilians residing within German territory constituted crimes against humanity. See
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, art. 6(c).
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administrators and functionaries in the Belsen concentration camp,
the Military Court conceded that its jurisdiction was restricted to war
crimes committed against British inmates and inmates of various
other Allied states. The Tribunal appeared to accept that acts
directed against a Hungarian inmate were properly before the Court
because Hungary shifted its loyalties prior to the issuance of the
British Royal Warrant. The Tribunal also held that inmates from
territories annexed by Germany qualified as Allied nationals because
the Reich's annexation was not considered to be complete as long as
armies in the field were contesting the German occupation. The
Tribunal noted that delicts against individuals who were not Allied
nationals could be admitted as evidence to establish a pattern of
mistreatment." The Belsen Court also convicted five Polish
nationals of committing war crimes against Allied nationals. The
Court explained that the accused worked on behalf of, and identified
with, the German authorities.56
In Motuskuke, A Netherlands East Indies Court-Martial
Tribunal addressed whether a victim qualified as an Allied national.
The Court presided over the prosecution of Susuki Motosuke for
various murders, including the execution of Barends, a Dutch subject
who had voluntarily joined the Japanese Army. The Court ruled
Barends' enlistment resulted in the loss of his Dutch citizenship. As
a result, Motosuke was not considered culpable of a war crime
against an Allied national. Instead, he was convicted of the common
law crime of murder.5
55. Trial Of Josef Kramer And 44 Others (The Belsen Trial), (Brit. Milt. Ct.,
Luneburg, Sept. 17th-Nov. 17th, 1945), 2 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 150,
150-151 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) [hereinafter Belsen].
56. Id. at 150-52 (Notes on the Case). The decision also affirmed that civilians
could be held culpable of war crimes. Id at 152. In another case, prisoner Berg,
along with five German combatants, was found guilty of the killing of three British
and one French female nationals. See Trial Of Werner Rohde And Eight Others,
(Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Germany, May 29th-June 1st, 1946), 5 L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 54 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Rhode].
57. Trial Of Susuki Motosuke, (Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial,
Amboina, Jan. 28th, 1948), 13 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 126, 128-29
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Motosuke].
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British military courts in the prosecution of Nazi military
officers who killed Italian nationals later modified the requirement
that war crimes must be directed against Allied nationals. At the
time of these killings, Italy had entered into an armistice with the
Allied Powers and was recognized as a co-belligerent power. The
British Military Courts rationalized that their jurisdiction extended to
crimes directed against co-belligerent nationals as well as Allied
Powers."
Other domestic courts were less willing to flexibly interpret the
scope of their jurisdiction. A French Military Tribunal sitting in
Strasbourg sentenced defendant Gruner to death for murdering four
British airmen. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Military Court
lacked jurisdiction because Gruner's crimes were committed against
Allied combatants in Germany.5 9
War crimes trials were envisioned as being based on the
territorial principle. In practice, states whose nationals had been
victimized or whose interests had been impinged assumed primary
jurisdiction. States extended their jurisdiction beyond their own
territory and nationals by relying on the universal principle, asserting
an interest in punishing crimes committed against the nationals of
other Allied Powers, and claiming sovereign jurisdiction over
occupied Germany. Courts also flexibly interpreted the definition of
Allied belligerents. Together, these rulings permitted domestic
tribunals to assume a broad scope of jurisdiction over Axis war
criminals. 60
58. See Trial Of General Von Mackensen And General Maelzer, (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Nov. 18th-30th, 1945), VIII L. REPOT TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Von Mackensen]; The Trial Of Albert
Kesselring, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Venice, Italy, Feb. 17th-May 6th, 1947), Id at 9
[hereinafter Kesseiring].
59. Wagner I, supra note 34, at 47-49.
60. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying texts.
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III. WAR CRIMES TRIALS
A. Superior Orders
Before Nuremberg, the international consensus was that states
were legally responsible for breaches of the humanitarian law of
war.6 The Nuremberg judgment and the decisions of Domestic War
Crimes Tribunals took the unprecedented step of extending criminal
liability to combatants as well as to civilians.62 These Tribunals
refused to recognize that war crimes constituted an act of state for
which only defendants could be held accountable before a domestic
forum. Such crimes were considered to contravene the acceptable
contours of a country's conduct, and consequently did not fall within
a state's sovereign prerogatives.63
Article Eight of the Nuremberg Charter addressed the superior
orders defense. This provision provided that "[t]he fact that the
Defendant acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a
superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines
that justice so requires."'  The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg refined the requirements of Article Eight and ruled
that a soldier [who] was ordered to kill or torture in
61. But see Commission On The Responsibility Of The Authors Of The War
And On Enforcement Of Penalties (March, 29, 1991), 14 AM. J. INTL L. 96
(1919). Convention (No. IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On
Land, With Annexes And Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 STAT. 2277, T.S. NO.
539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. A belligerent violating the
provisions of the Hague Convention is liable to pay compensation. Id. at art. 2.
62. Belsen, supra note 55, at 147-48. On the liability of civilians, see Zyklon B,
supra note 53, at 103.
63. Trial Of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, (Sup. Nat'l Trib. of Poland, June 2 1st-July
7th, 1946), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 71, 117 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Greiser].
64. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 8.
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violation of the international law of war has never
been recognized as a defense to... acts of brutality,
though... the order may be urged in mitigation...
[t]he true test... is not the existence of the order, but
whether moral choice was in fact possible.65
In contemplation of the convening of the International Military
Tribunal, both Great Britain and the United States abandoned
sweeping statements recognizing the superior orders defense, and
instead adjusted the discussions in their military manuals to
anticipate the Nuremberg standard.66 The German Military Penal
Code of 1872 provided qualified recognition of the superior orders
defense. The plea was admissible other than in instances in which
subordinates exceeded an order, were aware of an order's
criminality, or played a small part in carrying out the crime.67
Domestic war crimes legislation did not invariably incorporate
a superior orders defense. Statutes that made provisions for such a
plea failed to fully endorse the Nuremberg standard--accepting that
under appropriate circumstances, superior orders could be pled as a
defense as well as in mitigation. The Canadian provision stated that
"superior orders ... shall not constitute an absolute defense ... it
may . . . be considered either as a defense or in mitigation of
punishment if... justice so requires."6 The Norwegian statute only
recognized superior orders in mitigation, but noted that "[i]n
65. XXII Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal 411,466 (1948) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
66. See Trial Of General Anton Dostler, Commander Of The 75th Germany
Army Corps,(The Dostler Case), (U.S. Milit. Comm., Rome, Oct. 8th-12th, 1945),
1 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22, 31-32 (1947) (Notes on the
Case])[hereinafter Dostler]. Both the American and British military manuals, prior
to their amendments, provided for the superior orders defense while imposing
liability on the officer issuing the order. The British provision was modified to
preclude the superior orders defense. The American manual, in contrast, permitted
superior orders to be pled in mitigation as well as in defense. Id.
67. Zuehlke, supra note 38, at 150.
68. Canadian Law, supra note 8, at 129.
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particularly extenuating circumstances the punishment may be
entirely remitted." 69
These standards and statutes were subsequently interpreted in a
uniform manner by domestic tribunals to mitigate a defendant's
sentence when an accused lacked the requisite criminal intent.
Therefore, the plea of superior orders was recognized in the
instances in which the defendant was unaware, and a reasonable
person would have been unaware, of an order's illegality. The plea
was also admissible in cases in which the defendant was compelled
to act in order to avoid the imminent infliction of serious bodily
harm or death.7 °
General Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, Commander-in-Chief of
the German Armed Forces in Norway, received, re-issued, and
carried out Adolf Hitler's Commando Order of 1942. This order
called for the summary execution of uniformed and non-uniformed
Allied troops apprehended behind German lines.71 A British
Military Court convicted von Falkenhorst of war crimes and the
confirming officer commuted his death sentence to life
imprisonment.72 The Court determined that von Falkenhorst was
aware, or should have been aware, that the Commando Order
violated an unchallenged rule of warfare that outraged the general
sentiments of humanity.7" The Fuehrer's order admonished that a
69. Norwegian Law, supra note 25, at 85. The Netherlands statute was
particularly problematic. The superior orders defense was recognized so long the
order was within a superior's competent authority. Netherlands Law, supra note
18, at 99.
70. See infra notes 71-84. A Netherlands Special Court of Cassation adopted
the position that the Nuremberg standard could not be regarded as a widely
accepted principle of international law and that, in any event Article Eight was
limited to major war criminals and did not extend to lower-level combatants.
Zuehlke, supra note 38, at 149.
71. Trial Of Generaloberst Nickolaus Von Falkenhorst (Brunswick, Brit. Milit.
Ct., July 29th-Aug. 2d, 1946), XI L. RPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 18-23 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Von Falkenhorst]. The defendant
reissued the order to his commanders in October 1942. Id. at 22.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id. at 25 (Notes on the Case).
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refusal to carry out the command would result in court-martial.
However, the Tribunal failed to find that disobedience would lead to
the immediate threat or infliction of serious bodily harm or death.74
Von Falkenhorst also pled that the commando killings were
justified acts of reprisal. The Tribunal ruled that von Falkenhorst
was required to demonstrate that he possessed a good faith belief that
he had engaged in lawful reprisals. It conceded that the law of
reprisals was quite controversial and confusing, and that even a
senior soldier could be confounded and incapable of comprehending
this area of the law.
The Tribunal also recognized that von Falkenhorst relied on the
text of Hitler's Commando Order, which strongly suggested that the
killings were in retaliation for the commandos' continued
contravention of international law. Nevertheless, the Court
determined that "there were no facts upon which the court could find
that the defendant really believed that the Fuehrer Order purported to
be a reprisal ... 76
Von Falkenhorst was also charged with ordering his troops to
transfer Jewish prisoners of war to the Security Police for execution.
74. Id (Notes on the Case). The Court failed to find an instance in which
duress has been successfully raised as a complete defense on a charge of
committing a war crime. Id Two aspects of the Commando Order clearly
contravened international law. Firstly, those apprehended were to be executed
without trial. Secondly, the order applied to uniformed combatants engaged in
legitimate acts of war. The question of commando war crimes in Norway might
potentially arise in the case of Allied combatants who discarded their uniforms and
were apprehended while fleeing to the Swedish border in ski clothes. These
individuals might be prosecuted as war traitors or spies. Id. at 28.
75. Id at 25-26 (Notes on the Case).
76. Id at 26 (Notes on the Case). The Court did not resolve whether a
defendant's good faith belief constituted a defense, or whether a defendant also
must demonstrate that he or she neither knew, or ought to have known, that the
order did not satisfy the legal requirements for an act of reprisal. Id Article 23 of
the Hague Convention prohibits the killing or wounding of an enemy, as well as
declaring that "no quarter will be given." Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art.
23(c)-(d). For a discussion of reprisals, see supra notes 103-131 and
accompanying texts.
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He was unaware that the policy was to transfer prisoners of war to
Germany. He was found guilty based on the fact that "he thought
that it could be carried out but was surprised to find that it could not
or was not..
In Wielen, the Head of the Criminal Police in Breslau along
with members of the S.S. were charged with executing fifty
members of the Royal Air Force and other Allied forces who had
escaped from Stalag Luft III, a prisoner of war camp in Silesia.
These killings were ordered by Adolf Hitler, and were subsequently
recorded as having occurred during the prisoners' escape.78
The British Military Court determined that the defendants must
have been aware that the execution of the prisoners violated an
unchallenged rule of warfare and outraged the general sentiments of
humanity. A belief that the detainees were spies and saboteurs
would not have been exonerating because even those charged with
such crimes are entitled to a trial. The Tribunal noted that the
imposition of this objective superior orders standard was equitable
and fair because it paralleled German military law. There was also
no evidence that the executions had been undertaken in response to a
threat of immediate bodily harm or death. Nonetheless, the Judge
Advocate observed that duress did not constitute a defense to
murder. The notes to the case point out that acceptance of the
defendants' superior orders plea would have unacceptably limited
liability to the Fuehrer.7
9
77. Von Falkenhorst, supra note 71, at 29 (Notes on the Case). A defendant
who did not believe that the order could be carried out would be acquitted. Id.
78. Trial Of Max Wielen And 17 Others (The Stalag Luft III Case) (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Hamburg, July lst-Sept. 3rd, 1947), 11 L. RPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 31-34
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Wielen].
79. Id at 46-47, 50-51 (Notes on the Case). Oscar Hans was in charge of a
Sonderkommando charged with the execution of death sentences imposed by
Norwegian occupation courts. He was responsible for the killing of at least 312
Norwegians, 68 of whom were executed without trial. Hitler abolished these
tribunals in July 1944. The Lagmannsrett (lower court) convicted Hans, finding
that he should have been aware that the victims were deprived of a trial. The
Supreme Court, however, disputed this finding and questioned whether the
documents ordering execution were sufficiently deficient to have notified the
defendant of the illegality. Trial Of Hauptsturmfuehrer Oscar Hans (Eidsivating
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The defendants argued that, as a matter of equity, they should
not be placed in the position of having to choose between defiance of
either domestic or international law. The notes to the case observe
that the defendants were not presented with this problem because,
absent authorization from a judicial tribunal, Hitler lacked the
authority to order executions. Nevertheless, assuming the legality of
the Fuehrer's command, the prevailing opinion was that international
law takes precedence over the dictates of domestic law."0
Peleus was the third British judgment to address superior
orders. Four members of a German submarine crew were convicted
of following orders to fire upon the surviving crew of the Peleus.
The Judge Advocate instructed that there was no duty to obey an
unlawful order. The fact that a rule of warfare was violated pursuant
to the order of a belligerent government or military official did not
deprive the act of its criminal character or confer immunity from
punishment. The Judge Advocate recognized that combatants could
not be expected to consult an international law text or academic
specialist during the heat of battle. However, "It must have been
obvious to the most rudimentary intelligence that [the order to fire
upon the crew] was not a lawful command, and that those who shot
are not to be excused for doing it upon the ground of superior
orders." 8'
In Bruns, three members of the German occupation authorities
were accused of abusing and torturing suspected members of the
81Norwegian resistance. 2 The Lagmannsrett (lower court) ruled that
the resistance adhered to the humanitarian law of war and that the
Lagmannsrett, January 1947 and Supreme Court Of Norway, Aug. 1947), 5 L.
REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 82, 87 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
80. Wielen, supra note 78, at 50. The notes indicated that the same standards
governing defenses based on compliance with municipal law were involved with
the superior orders defense. Id
81. Peleus, supra note 15, at 12.
82. Trial Of Kriminalsekretaer Richard Wilhelm Hermann Bruns And Two
Others, (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett and The Supreme Court of Norway, March
20th-July 3rd, 1946), 3 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 15, 16 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1947).
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acts of torture--leg screws, cold baths and blows and kicks in the
face--were not justified reprisals. The Court dismissed the defense
that they would have been subjected to retribution had they refused
to engage in torture. The judges suggested that the defendants had
taken the initiative on various occasions because they "could not
believe that a state, even Nazi Germany, could force its subjects, if
they were unwilling, to perform such brutal and atrocious acts as
those of which the defendants were guilty."83 Superior orders could
not be considered in mitigation of such serious offenses because "if a
nation, which, without warning has attacked another, finds it
necessary to use such methods to fight opposition, then those guilty
must be punished, whether they gave the orders or carried them
out."
84
Superior orders were recognized in mitigation in several cases.
In Sawada, a United States military court convicted two Japanese
military judges who presided over the unfair and fraudulent trial and
conviction of eight United States pilots. The warden responsible for
the pilots' confinement and execution was also convicted. All three
were determined to have acted in accordance with the special
instructions of their superiors. The three lower-level defendants
were sentenced to relatively light sentences of five to nine years of
hard labor.8 5 This sentence may have reflected that Warrant and
Petty Officers acted at the direct command of a Rear-Admiral at a
time when the Japanese forces were witnessing the inexorable
advance of American troops throughout the South Pacific. 6
Major-General Shigeru Sawada was absent at the front during
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id. The Supreme Court concurred in this analysis. The Court noted that on
some occasions the defendants had taken the initiative in torturing prisoners and
that such conduct had been tolerated, but not ordered, by their superiors. Judge
Larssen also doubted whether those who exercised leniency towards prisoners
would have been punished. Id at 19-20.
85. Sawada, supra note 49, at 5-8.
86. Id. at 18 (Notes on the Case). Tatsuta briefly visited the courtroom, but the
Court failed to find that he possessed either actual or constructive knowledge of
the trial's illegality. Id at 6.
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the trial. The Commission seemed satisfied that Sawada lacked
authority to remit or mitigate the sentences, and that he had
discharged his responsibility by protesting the punishments to the
Commanding General of the China Forces.87 The sentences in
Sawada were rather remarkable since Yusei Wako, the law member
of the Military Tribunal, and Ryuhei Okada, the lay-member, both
unquestioningly accepted flawed and fraudulent evidence and
unflinchingly imposed the death penalty.88
In Jaluit Atoll, four members of the Japanese navy were
convicted of executing three American airmen without a trial.8 9
Three of the defendants were sentenced to death and the fourth,
Ensign Tasaki, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. This
relatively lenient sentence reflected the "brief, passive and
mechanical participation of the accused." 9  Despite Tasaki's
sentence, the Tribunal rejected the defendants' argument that they
should not be judged by Western concepts and ideals since Japan
was an authoritarian society and the Emperor's orders were
considered the imperial will.91
In the Trial Of Albert Wagner, the accused was convicted and
sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for murdering a Russian
worker who was attempting to escape a slave labor camp. The
French Court noted that the worker was entitled to flee confinement.
However, "[a] guard ... is not likely to be able to distinguish a
lawfully from an unlawfully detained prisoner, and in such case may
87. Id at 7. Sawada was sentenced to hard labor for five years. This was based
on his negligent failure to investigate the treatment of the prisoners. Id. at 7-8.
88. Id at7.
89. Trial Of Rear-Admiral Nisuke Masuda And Four Others Of the Imperial
Japanese Navy (The Jaluit Atoll Case) (United States Milit. Comm., Kwajalein
Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Dec. 7th-13th, 1945), 1 L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 71 (1947) [hereinafter Masuda].
90. Id. at76.
91. Id at 74 (Notes on the Case). The need for discipline, according to the
defendants, was accentuated by the declining strategic situation of the Japanese
forces. Id
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not be expected to judge whether or not he is under the obligation to
follow the instructions of his superiors, concerning the escape of
prisoners. 92
A French Court acquitted Ludwig Luger, Public Prosecutor, at
the Special Court at Strasbourg, France. Luger prosecuted thirteen
Alsatians who were falsely charged with killing a border guard
during an attempted escape to Switzerland. The accused were
denied fundamental due process rights, and Luger conceded at trial
that there was no evidence that the defendants were involved in the
killing. Nevertheless, Luger successfully demanded the death
sentence--which was subsequently carried out. No proof existed to
support that idea the proceedings were orchestrated by Robert
Wagner, Gauleiter and head of the civil government of Alsace.
Luger was found to have complied with Wagner's dictates, and was
acquitted. This presumably reflected the fact that Luger had not
made the decision to convict and execute the defendants. 93
In sum, domestic courts recognized superior orders as a plea in
mitigation where a defendant was determined to lack the requisite
criminal intent. Defendants seeking to rely on the plea were required
to demonstrate that they believed, and that a reasonable person
would have believed, that the order was legal. Conversely,
defendants were entitled to rely on superior orders in those instances
in which they were able to demonstrate that disobedience resulted in
imminent bodily harm or death. The latter, however, did not
constitute a defense to the taking of human life.94 Officials issuing
illegal orders that were not implemented were held liable in those
cases in which the order was issued with the intent that it should be
carried out.95
Courts feared that recognition of the superior orders defense
92. Trial Of Albert Wagner (Gen. Milit. Gov. Trib. of the French Zone Of
Occupation in Germany, Nov. 29th, 1946), 13 L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
118, 120 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter
Wagner II].
93. Wagner I, supra note 34, at 31-32 and 42.
94. See supra notes 64-65 and 79 and accompanying texts.
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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would limit liability to a small core of high-level officials.9 6
Nevertheless, tribunals were willing to recognize superior orders as a
defense, or in mitigation, in those instances in which an individual's
role was considered small and insubstantial.9 7 Sentences were also
mitigated in those cases in which lower-level officials could not have
been expected to fathom the factual and legal intricacies.9" However,
the superior orders plea was unsuccessful when defendants engaged
in serious and severe acts that were manifestly illegal.99 Tribunals
rejected the duress defense--determining that those who refused to
comply with commands were subject to retribution.1"0
The defense of reprisal confounded courts. Moreover, the law
of reprisal was considered complex and confusing and courts
conceded that even experienced military officials could not be
expected to comprehend the legal intricacies involved. The reprisal
plea was cognizable in instances where a defendant was able to
establish a good faith belief that there were adequate grounds to
support the claim.10 1
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 85-86, 90 and 93 and accompanying texts.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 79 and 81 and accompanying texts. "If you were to go to a
lunatic Asylum to visit a field-marshal who was an inmate there and he said: 'Go
and kill the head warder,' you would not, I imagine, go and do so and say: 'Well, I
had to as the field-marshal said do it."' Rohde, supra note 56, at 58 (Notes on the
Case).
100. See supra notes 7 and 82 and accompanying texts. See also Dostler, supra
note 66, at 27. Officers pled that they were required to take a special oath of
obedience to the Fuehrer. The Dostler Court noted that General von Saenger was
only able to cite two cases, one based on rumor, in which officers were executed
for disobedience of an order. Id
101. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying texts. It was uncertain whether a
good faith belief was sufficient, or whether defendants seeking to satisfy the
reasonableness standard were required to demonstrate that a reasonable person
with a comprehension of the law of reprisals would have believed the order to
have been lawful. Id
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Defendants complained that the abrogation of superior orders
placed them in the position of either adhering to the demands of
patriotism or principle. Court decisions, however, affirmed the
supremacy of international doctrine and the duty to defy the
unlawful dictates of domestic law.
10 2
B. Reprisals
It was well settled that a state victimized by conduct that
contravened international law was privileged to undertake an illegal
act in order to deter the continued action of the offender. Such
reprisals were accepted in peacetime, but their permissibility during
armed conflict remained questionable until the end of World War II.
Wartime reprisals were difficult to regulate. Individuals engaging in
illegal actions might conveniently claim that their criminal conduct
was a legitimate reprisal. This might be denied by the victim state--
ushering in an escalating cycle of violence. What are the
prerequisites for reprisals? Might innocent civilians be the targets of
such an act? Are reprisal killings justified? 103
Some treaties contained language that limited reprisals. 4
Article Two of The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, provides that "[m]easures of reprisal against them
[prisoners of war] are prohibited."'0 5  Article Fifty of the Hague
Convention states that "[n]o general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,
102. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. An individual only is required to
obey lawful orders. Although a combatant could not be expected to comprehend
the intricacies of international law, some principles were clear and unambiguous.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
103. See generally Judgment In Case Of Commander Karl Neumann (Hospital
Ship "Dover Castle") (1921), 16 AM. J. INTL. L. 704, 707 (1922).
104. But see Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1977 Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977)[hereinafter
Geneva Protocol I]. "Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of
reprisals are prohibited." Id at art. 51(6).
105. Geneva Convention supra note 39, at art. 2.
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shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of
individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and
severally responsible."1"6 The Nuremberg Charter includes killing of
hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war.07
A British Military Court addressed the law of reprisal in
Maelzer08 and Kesselring. 9 Both cases centered on a bomb
explosion in Rome that killed thirty-three German police officers.
Hitler issued an order to Field Marshal Albert Kesselring,
Commander of Army Group C in Italy, specifying that ten Italians
were to be shot for each German casualty. Kesselring transmitted
the order to General Hans Georg von Mackensen, Commander of the
German 14th Army in Rome. Von Mackensen, in turn, conveyed
the order to General Maelzer, Military Commander of the City of
Rome. Maelzer then charged Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Kappler,
Head of the Security Police, with carrying out the order. Only four
of the 335 who were subsequently executed were suspected of
involvement in the bombing. 10
Von Mackensen and Maelzer claimed that this was a justified
reprisal because during the month preceding the bomb attack, they
witnessed a series of assaults against German troops in Rome. They
nevertheless hoped to confine the impact of the order, and relied on
the assurances of the Security Police that the executions would be
limited to those already sentenced to lengthy prison terms or
death.'1 '
106. Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art. 50. There is support for the view
that this provision was not intended to limit reprisals, but was primarily directed
against collective fmancial burdens imposed by an occupying power. See Rauter,
supra note 33, at 137-38.
107. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(b).
108. Von Mackensen, supra note 58, at 1.
109. Kesselring, supra note 58, at 9.
110. Von Mackensen, supra note 58, at 1-2.
111. Id at 2. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Kappler, head of the Security Service,
stated that there were 280 persons "worthy of death"--imprisoned persons who
were sentenced to death awaiting execution, serving long sentences of
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The Court noted that reprisals must be preceded by a violation
of the laws and usages of war, and are intended to compel a
belligerent to conform to accepted legal standards. Reprisals are a
last resort that may be undertaken only when those responsible for
the criminal conduct cannot be apprehended and a prior complaint
has been lodged with the offending regime. These preconditions
may be waived when immediate action is required in order to
guarantee safety and security. Reprisals must also be proportionate
to the provocation and reasonable in character. The accused were
sentenced to life imprisonment.'12 The notes accompanying the case
observe that
[i]t cannot be said... whether the Court found that
the reprisals were unreasonable (i.e. the taking of
lives was not warranted) or that they were excessive
(i.e. the ratio 10:1 was not warranted) or that the
accused were responsible for the manner in which
they were carried out. Any of these three contentions
would support the findings." 3
imprisonment, or detained for partisan activities or acts of sabotage. Id at 1. The
accused explained that they expected only these detainees would be shot. Id. at 1-
2. Victims ranged in age from fourteen to seventy. A Court acquitted one of those
killed. Fifty-seven of the victims were non-Italian Jews who were not involved in
partisan activities. Id. at 2. The accused were divided into groups of five and each
group was brought into the Ardeatine Cave and shot. The cave was blown up
following the killings. Id.
112. Id. at 3-6 (Notes on the Case).
113. Id. at 7 (Notes on the Case). The notes to the case report that both the
American Rules of Land Warfare and the British Military Manual permit the
destruction of property in reprisal, but do not comment on the justifiability of
executing hostages. Id. at 5-6. The comments to the case, in reviewing the
judgment, note that:
[t]he question whether von Mackensen and Maelzer ordered only
prisoners who had been condemned to death or a long sentence of
imprisonment to be shot or others as well seems to have no bearing on
the finding, though it may have some bearing on the sentences... [I]f
the reprisal was reasonable and proportionate, no war crime could have
been committed even if the victims had been ... innocent people. [I]f
the . . . reprisal was unreasonable and excessive a war crime was
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As noted, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring conveyed Hitler's
orders requiring the killing often Italians for every German victim to
General von Mackensen. Two months later, Kesselring gave orders
to the German forces in Italy requiring that the partisans be attacked
and destroyed. In addition, he pledged that he would "protect any
commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice and
severity of the means he adopts whilst fighting partisans."'n4
Kesselring further ordered that partisan attacks were to be combated
through the seizure and execution of hostages, the burning of
villages, and the public hanging of perpetrators." 5
The Judge Advocate advised that international law addressed
the relations between organized governments. Kesselring had few
options--he could not negotiate with disparate and disorganized
partisan groups whom could not control their members. The
German forces were unable to apprehend those responsible for
partisan attacks and, as a result, Kesselring may have confronted a
situation in which it was justifiable to resort to reprisals against
innocents. 1 6 Kesselring was convicted on the first charge, but it was
not clear whether this was based on the fact that the ratio of ten-to-
one was excessive or whether 335 hostages, rather than the 330
hostages authorized under the Fuehrer's orders, were executed. On
the second charge, the Court determined that Kesselring's orders
committed even if... the victims had been sentenced to death or to
long-term imprisonment.
Id. at 7. The Court appeared to hold that both defendants possessed a duty to
insure that their orders were properly carried out. Id.
114. Kessering, supra note 58, at 10.
115. Id at 10-11. Kesselring noted in August that the Reich's indiscriminate
measures were harming the dignity and discipline of the German army. He
ordered a halt to such actions in September. Id. at 11.
116. Id at 13 (Notes on the Case). The Judge Advocate instructed that
international law was unclear on the permissibility of killing innocent hostages,
and under the conditions that existed, Kesselring should be given the benefit of the
doubt. Id
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constituted incitement to illegal activity rather than reprisals."7
The British Military Tribunals in Maelzer and Kesselring did
not directly rule on the permissibility of executing hostages." 8
However, this issue was addressed by a French Court in Holstein. In
Holstein, the accused had participated in a series of reprisals that
took place in Dijon in 1944. Civilians who were believed to support
the partisans were killed, their property was pillaged, and their farms
and dwellings were burned to the ground. Suspected resistance
members were summarily shot.' 19 The French Permanent Military
Tribunal convicted the various accused of involvement in
premeditated murder.1
20
The Tribunal conceded that the law of reprisals remained
imprecise. However, it noted that the authoritative trend of opinion
was that
while entitled to take hostages ... to bring about a
cessation of violations of the laws of war ... the
retaliating party is expected to treat hostages in a
humane manner, which in no case may lead to
putting them to death. Any such act ... [against]
hostages, would be criminal and would... result in a
situation where there was no "reprisal" in the proper
sense, but merely arbitrary acts of revenge.
121
117. Id at 13-14 (Notes on the Case). Thus, Kesselring knowingly and
deliberately issued orders which would forseeably result in illegal conduct by
German troops. Id
118. See Id. at 14 (Notes on the Case). The notes to the case distinguish between
hostages who are seized to guarantee future compliance with the humanitarian law
of war and those who are seized and executed in retaliation for unlawful acts.
Only the latter constitutes an act of reprisal. Id.
119. Trial Of Franz Holstein And Twenty-Three Others (Perm. Milit. Trib.,
Dijon, France, Feb. 3rd, 1947), VIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22-26
(U.N.War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Holstein].
120. Id. at 26. Twenty-two of the accused were convicted, and two were
acquitted. Id
121. Id at 29 (Notes on the Case). "[I]t would appear that wherever persons are
the objects of reprisals, their lives are the ultimate limit the retaliating party is not
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The Court noted that Holstein's recognition of killings as
lawful reprisals would erode the distinction between civilians and
combatants. No evidence existed that any of the victims were either
members of the resistance or had violated the humanitarian law of
war. 
122
The Netherlands Special Court of Cassation, in Rauter,
concurred with, and elaborated upon, the judgment of the French
Military Tribunal. Hans Albin Rauter served as Higher S.S.
(Security Service), Police Leader, and General Commissioner for
Public Safety in the Occupied Netherlands Territories. He was
sentenced to death for offenses against the Dutch civilian population,
including persecutions of Jews, deportations for slave labor, pillage
and confiscation of property, illegal arrests and detentions, and the
systematic execution of civilians and hostages.1
2 1
The Special Court of Cassation ruled that Germany engaged in
an illegal war of aggression, which was carried out in contravention
of the humanitarian law of war. Once having occupied the
Netherlands, Germany implemented an illicit policy of Nazification.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands, had it possessed the military
might and capacity, would have been legally entitled to engage in
reprisals against the German Third Reich. 24
Was Germany authorized to engage in reprisals? Reprisals are
intended to correct the conduct of States rather than partisans.
Germany, as an occupying power, was authorized to apprehend and
punish the perpetrators of illicit acts of resistance, but was not
entitled to impose collective penalties on innocents. The notes
accompanying the case observe that "[t]he rule which emerges is that
offenses committed by members of the civilian population of an
occupied territory can in no case entitle the occupying Power to kill
permitted to transgress." Id
122. Id at 29. French law established that killing in reprisal constituted
premeditated murder. Id
123. Rauter, supra note 33, at 93-105.
124. Id. at 134-35 (Notes on the Case). Germany would not have been legally
authorized to respond with counter-reprisals. Id at 135.
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hostages. All it is entitled to do is to punish the actual offenders, if it
can lay its hands on them."'25
The Norwegian Lagmannsrett convicted Gerhard Friedrich
Ernst Flesch, Commander of the Security Service in northern
Norway and the Falstad Concentration Camp, of murder. Flesch
ordered the torture and execution of various Norwegians suspected
of membership in the resistance. The Tribunal ruled that "an act of
reprisal can in no circumstances be pleaded in exculpation unless it
was... announced publicly.., or it appeared from the act ... that it
was intended as a reprisal and showed clearly against what unlawful
acts it was directed."'26 Flesch's acts "must be considered as acts
solely intended to terrorize the population in order to stem the
underground movement. It was considered significant... that the
defendant's underlings had reacted against the inhumane orders by
trying to avoid carrying them out."'27 The Lagmannsrett, in Bruns,
also rejected the defendants' claim that their torture of detainees had
been intended as reprisals. These acts, according to the Norwegian
Court, had been routinely carried out to compel confessions and to
inflict punishments.
Reprisals were generally understood to aim at
changing the adversary's conduct and forcing him to
keep generally accepted rules of warfare. If this aim
were to be achieved, the reprisals must be made
125. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis omitted) (Notes on the Case).
126. Trial Of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer,
Oberregierungsrat, (Frostating Lagmannsrett, Nov.-Dec. 1946; and Sup. Ct. of
Norway, Feb. 1948), VI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 111, 115 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948). These acts did not satisfy the requisites for reprisals. The
Germans did not announce that the killings were undertaken as acts of reprisal. In
fact, the accused were shot in the back to make it appear that they had been killed
while escaping. The specific acts the reprisals were directed to deter were never
specified. Id at 115-16. The Court noted that lawful acts of war committed by
uniformed British troops behind enemy lines did not breach international law. The
Germans, however, did not distinguish between acts committed by uniformed and
non-uniformed combatants. Id. at 115-16.
127. Id. at 116.
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public and announced as such ... [T]here was no
indication from the German side... that their acts.
. were to regarded as reprisals.. .. 128
These domestic court decisions clarified the law of reprisal
during armed conflict. Reprisals were intended to deter the illegal
activity of belligerent states. Courts recognized the difficulty of
distinguishing between repression and reprisals. As a result,
reprisals were constrained by a number of procedural requirements.
The reprisals were to be undertaken as a last resort following a
warning to cease and desist from illicit conduct. Such acts were only
permissible in those instances in which the perpetrators could not be
apprehended. The reprisal was to be proportionate to the
provocation and limited by the rule of reasonableness.'29
An Occupying Power was prohibited from killing or taking
reprisals against innocents. The occupant was required to apprehend
and punish those responsible for delicts.'3 ° There was support for the
view that hostages could be detained, but that they were to be
humanely treated. 3'
C. Command Responsibility
A number of courts imposed vicarious liability on high-ranking
military officials. In In Re Yamashita, the United States Supreme
Court confirmed the conviction of Tomoyuki Yamashita,
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial
Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. The 260,000 troops under
Yamashita's command committed widespread atrocities during the
American invasion of the Philippines in October 1943. More than
25,000 unarmed noncombatant civilians were mistreated and
128. Bruns, supra note 82, at 19.
129. See supra notes 103-128 and accompanying texts.
130. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying texts. But see supra note 116
and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 121 and 122 and accompanying texts.
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murdered in Batangas Province alone.
13 2
The Supreme Court ruled that the law of war presumes that a
responsible military commander will control the conduct of
combatants, stating:
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by
troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders
or efforts of their commander would almost certainly
result in violations, which [it] is the purpose of the
law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian
populations and prisoners of war from brutality
would largely be defeated if the commander of an
invading army could with impunity neglect to take
reasonable measures for their protection. Hence the
law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war
by commanders who are to some extent responsible
for their subordinates.133
What reasonable measures is a military official required to
undertake? According to the United States Supreme Court, a
commander possesses an "affirmative duty to take such measures as
were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to
protect prisoners of war and the civilian population."'34
Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was named General Officer of
the 37th Japanese Army in Borneo in 1944. Masao permitted the
forced march of 1,000 American and British prisoners planned by
132. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14,32 (1945).
133. Id at 15.
134. Id. at 16. The United States Military Commission that initially conducted
the prosecution evaluated the totality of the circumstances in evaluating the
measures that Yamashita might have reasonably undertaken. The Commission
considered the pressures created by the rapidly advancing United States forces, the
miscalculations of Yamashita's predecessors as well as the organization,
equipment, supply, training, discipline and morale of Yamashita's troops. The
Commission concluded that Yamashita had not taken the measures that were
required under the circumstances to control his troops. Id. at 17, n.4.
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his predecessor to proceed. A large number of the already weakened
prisoners died during the 165-mile trek. The final death total was
overwhelming--only thirty-three of the prisoners were alive at the
end of July 1944. The survivors were executed by troops under
Masao's command the following month.'35 The Judge Advocate
instructed the Australian Military Court to find Masao guilty if "war
crimes were committed as a result of the accused's failure to
discharge his duties as a commander, either by deliberately failing in
his duties or by culpably or willfully disregarding them, not caring
whether this resulted in the commission of a war crime or not.'
' 36
Masao was sentenced to death by hanging.
137
A Canadian Military Court, in the Abbaye Ardenne Case,
convicted Kurt Meyer, Commander of the 25th S.S. Panzer
Grenadier Regiment of the 12th S.S. Panzer Division, of the killing
of prisoners of war. Although the Court determined that Meyer had
not ordered the executions, it held him vicariously liable for the
killings that occurred adjacent to his regimental headquarters. 38 The
Judge Advocate instructed the Court that a high-ranking officer is
liable for a failure to assert that measure of disciplinary control that a
military official is obligated to exercise. Under Canadian law, once
a course of conduct in contravention of the laws and customs of war
is established, the burden of going forward shifts to the accused. 39
135. Baba Masao, supra note 45, at 56-57.
136. Id. at 60 (Notes on the Case). In determining the extent of a commander's
duty, "future courts will have to be guided by the nature of the accused's military
command as well as by the strategic situation and the circumstances in which he
had to exercise his command." Id. at 59 (Notes on the Case).
137. Id. at 57. See also Trial Of Willi Mackensen (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hannover, Jan.
28th, 1946), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 81 (1949) [hereinafter
Mackensen].
138. Trial Of S.S. Brigadefuehrer Kurt Meyer (The Abbaye Ardenne Case),
(Canadian Milit. Ct., Aurich, Germany, Dec. l0th-29th, 1945), IV L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 97, 103, 109 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)
[hereinafter Meyer].
139. Id. at 110-11 (Notes on the Case). Canadian war crimes legislation
provided for vicarious liability. Canadian Law supra note 8, at 128 (1948).
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In Student, General Kurt Student was convicted of three of
seven counts pertaining to atrocities committed by his parachute
troops in Crete against British prisoners of war and combatants. The
Court appeared to find that the employment of prisonrs to unload
ammunition and the punishment of those who refused were part of
an intentional policy adopted by Student. However, Student had not
ordered and had no reasonable basis for anticipating that prisoners
would be deployed to screen the advance of German troops or that a
field hospital had been targeted for an aerial attack. The fact that
Student had supervised the training of his troops was not sufficient
to impose vicarious liability for all of the crimes that they had
committed. The Court also appears to have accepted the view of the
Judge Advocate that parachutists inevitably work in isolated and
small autonomous groups, and that a less strict standard of command
liability should be imposed. 40
Vicarious liability was extended to low-level combatants in the
Essen Lynching Case. In Essen, a British Military Court convicted
Hauptmann Erich Heyer of publicly ordering his troops to refrain
from intervening to protect three British prisoners of war. The
captured airmen, who were in the custody of a military unit under
Heyer's command, were attacked and killed by a German mob while
being escorted to a Luftwaffe base for questioning.141 The Court, in
convicting a Private Koenen, noted that
'Where there is evidence that more than one war crime has
been committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or
group while under the command of a single commander, the
court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence of the
responsibility of the commander for those crimes.'
Id at 128 (emphasis omitted).
140. Trial Of Kurt Student, (Brit. Milt. Ct., Luneberg, Germany, May 6th-10th,
1946), IV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 118-124 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1948)[hereinafter Student].
141. Trial Of Erich Heyer And Six Others (The Essen Lynching Case), (Brit.
Milit. Ct., Essen Dec. 18th-19th and Dec. 21st-22nd 1945), I L. REPT. TRIALS
WAR CRIM. 88, 89 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947)[hereinafter Essen
Lynching].
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this escort, as the representative of the Power which
had taken the airmen prisoners, had the duty not only
to prevent them from escaping but also of seeing that
they were not molested .... [I]t was the duty of the
escort ... to protect the people in his custody... [and
he] failed to do what his duty required him to do.142
In the Velpke Children's Home Case, a British Military Court
imposed vicarious liability on the head regional Nazi official, a
doctor, and an administrator, all of whom were in charge of the
Velpke Children's Home, an institution established for Polish
children involuntarily separated from mothers working in Germany.
The three rarely, if ever, visited the Velpke Home or took an interest
in the children's condition. The institution was filthy and infested
with flies--over eighty Polish infants died in six months. The Court
appeared to concur with the prosecutor's argument that once the
infants were forcibly removed from their mothers, parental
responsibility devolved onto the relevant Nazi officials. Hermann
Mueller, the leading official in the village, and Werner North, the
mayor, were both aware of the deaths in the home, but did nothing to
alleviate the situation. Nevertheless, the two were acquitted based
142. Id. at 90. Heyer was sentenced to death by hanging; Koenen was sentenced
to five years imprisonment. Id In 1945, a British Military Court seemingly
restricted the doctrine of vicarious liability in Killinger. Three of the five
defendants were convicted of being "concerned as parties to the ill-treatment of
British Prisoners of War." Trial Of Erich Killinger And Four Others, (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Wuppertal, Nov. 26th-Dec. 3rd, 1945), III L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
67 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)[hereinafter Killinger]. The British Court
ruled that vicarious liability may not be imposed on a commanding officer based
on mere negligence. There must be a demonstration that the officer intentionally
refrained from fulfilling their duty. Id at 69 (Notes on the Case). But see Trial Of
Major Karl Raner And Six Others (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Germany, Feb.
18th, 1946), IV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 113, 117 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1948)[hereinafter Rauer] (Acquitted of subordinates initial execution of
prisoners of war and held liable for failing to take action following the second
incident). The Judge Advocate in Masao instructed that the mental standard was
satisfied by either an intentional or negligent omission. Supra note 45, at 60 (Notes
on the Case).
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on the fact that they had lacked official authority to intervene.1
43
In sum, civilian and military officials are vicariously liable for
the acts of their subordinates of which they possess either actual or
constructive knowledge." 4 This is not a strict liability standard, and
officials are not culpable for the obscure and distant actions of their
subordinates.
145
Officials are obligated to intervene and to take reasonable steps
to prevent illicit conduct. The reasonableness of an official's actions
is dependent on various factors, including the available avenues of
communication, the experience and training of subordinates, and the
nature and scope of the provocation and criminal conduct. 46 The
prevailing view is that an intentional or negligent failure to act is
sufficient to impose criminal liability. 147  Some domestic codes
provided that once aprimafacie case was established, the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of an official's actions shifted to the
accused. 148
D. Naval Warfare
The London Protocol of 1930 specifies that prior to attacking a
merchant vessel, a submarine must insure that the passengers, crew,
and ship's papers are secured in a safe site. This standard is not
satisfied by placing the crew in a vessel's lifeboats, unless the attack
143. Trial of Heinrich Gerike and Seven Others (The Velpke Children's Home
Case) (Brit. Milit. Ct., Brunswick, March 20th-April 3rd, 1946), VII L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 76-79 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter
Gerike]. The Judge Advocate instructed the Court that either an intent or
negligence standard could be appropriately applied. Id at 81 (Notes on the Case).
144. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying texts.
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. See also supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
148. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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is proximate to land or to another vessel that is in a position to take
the sailors on board.
1 49
The Commander of the German Navy, Admiral Karl Donitz,
was charged at Nuremberg with ordering the waging of unrestricted
submarine warfare. The prosecution argued that German U-Boats
failed to follow the requirement of warning merchant ships of an
impending attack. The defense countered that the security of the
submarine is the guiding rule at sea, and the threat of air attack often
made rescue risky. The Tribunal said "[i]f the commander cannot
rescue, then ... he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it
to pass unharmed before his periscope. These orders . . .prove
Donitz... guilty of a violation of the Protocol."15° The Tribunal
ruled that "the evidence does not establish with the certainty required
that Donitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors.
The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest
censure."'
151
Korvetten Kapitaen Karl-Heinz Moehle was the commander of
the 5th U-boat Flotilla at Kiel, and was responsible for briefing as
many as three hundred U-boat commanders prior to their operational
patrols. Moehie's responsibilities included acquainting the U-boat
commanders with the Laconia Order of 1942, which provided that
"[r]escue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the
destruction of enemy ships and crews."'52 The order also
149. Proce's-Verbal Relating To The Rules Of Submarine Warfare Set Forth In
Part IV Of The Treaty Of London Of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, T.S. 29, 31
AM. J. INTL. L. 137 (Supp. 1937).
150. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 65, at 559.
151. Id Donitz, on the order of the Fuehrer, also established operational zones
within which neutral ships were sunk without warning. The Tribunal adjudged
this to be a violation of the London Protocol. Id at 558. A sentence was not
assessed against Donitz on this charge for breaches of the law of submarine
warfare on the grounds of reciprocity. The Tribunal noted that the British
Admiralty had announced on May 8, 1940, that all vessels should be sunk at night
in the Skagerrak, and that the United States had carried out unrestricted submarine
warfare in the Pacific Ocean. Id at 559.
152. Trial Of Karl-Heinz Moehle, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Haumburg, Oct. 15-16th,
1946), IX L. REPT TRIALS WAR CRIM. 75-78 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
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admonished commanders to "[b]e harsh, having in mind that the
enemy has no regard for the women and children in his bombing
attacks on German cities."'53 Moehle advised the commanders to
destroy any safety rafts that they encountered carrying airmen or the
crews of sunken vessels. He admonished that a failure to kill these
combatants may permit their rescue and re-entry into the war.
Moehle concluded by reminding the commanders that "the safety of
your own boat must always remain your primary consideration."'54
The Judge Advocate instructed that international law imposes a duty
upon submarine commanders to save the lives of their crew. A
commander is relieved of this duty in those instances in which the
safety of his ship would be jeopardized. The Judge Advocate noted
the prosecution had argued that the Laconia Order required a refusal
to rescue survivors, regardless of the circumstances, which
effectively condemned the survivors to death.155 Moehle was
sentenced to five years in prison.
5 6
The notes of the Moehle case scrutinized the International
Military Tribunal and determined that Donitz should be criticized for
issuing the ambiguous Laconia Order, but that he was not legally
culpable for ordering the killing of shipwrecked survivors. Moehle,
on the other hand, gave the impression that the policy of the Naval
High Command was to kill the ship's crew. Thus, "whereas there
was a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of Doenitz's order and...
1949)[hereinafter Moehle].
153. Id.
154. Id at 76.
155. Id. at 77-78. The defense contended that the order contained a prohibition
against rescuing the crews, but did not specifically require killing the crews.
Moehle contended that, by instructing the commanders to act in accordance with
the dictates of their conscience, he had taken steps to ameliorate the impact of
the command. Moehle, however, admitted on cross-examination that a failure
to rescue would likely result in the death of the crew. The Judge Advocate
instructed that there was no duty to rescue in those instances in which the
submarine would be placed in danger. But, the prosecution contended that the
order prohibited rescue under all circumstances. Id. at 77-78.
156. Id at78.
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the benefit of that doubt was given to Doenitz ... there was no such
doubt in view... [of] the way in which Moehle had added to this
order."15
7
Moehle argued there was no evidence that ships were sunk or
that sailors were drowned as a result of his instructions. The Court,
however, concurred with the Judge Advocate that the inference was
that Moehle's orders and explanations had influenced the conduct of
U-boat commanders.
58
In Peleus, the Greek ship Peleus was sunk by German
submarine No. 852 commanded by Heinz Eck. Eck was charged
with ordering crew members to fire machine guns and throw
grenades at the lifeboats and rafts carrying the survivors. He had
advised the U-boat crew that "[i]f we are influenced by too much
sympathy, we must also think of our wives and children who at
home die also as victims of air attack.' 159 Only three of the thirty-
five civilian sailors survived the attack. Eck pled that his intent had
been to eliminate all traces of the Peleus in order to conceal the site
of the sinking. He feared that the debris would reveal the location of
the assault and result in the aerial spotting and sinking of his U-boat.
Eck also claimed he had not realized the attack harmed any of the
surviving crew. He testified that he believed the crew had jumped
out of the rescue vessels, but made no effort to assist them because
his orders prohibited rescue.160
The Judge Advocate instructed the Tribunal that the killing of
unarmed enemies was a grave breach of the law of nations. There
were circumstances of operational necessity under which such an act
might be justified, but the facts appeared to contradict Eck's claim
157. Id. at 80 (Notes on the Case).
158. Id. at 81. The Judge Advocate noted that what occurred as a result of these
orders was not relevant in determining Moehle's guilt. Nonetheless, he instructed
that the conduct of U-boat commanders following the issuance of this order over a
period of years provided evidence of the interpretation that a reasonable U-boat
commander would give to the order. Id.
159. Peleus, supra note 15, at 5.
160. Id.
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that his intent had been to safeguard his submarine. The Judge
Advocate pointed out that Eck had cruised the site for five hours
rather than flee the site of the attack and that sinking the remnants of
the Peleus would not eliminate oil slicks. The Court convicted and
sentenced Eck to death, suggesting that the Tribunal believed Eck
could have more effectively safeguarded the submarine through a
swift escape."'
A British Military Court convicted Helmut von Ruchteschell
for attacking three British merchant ships without giving them fair
warning. In each case, von Ruchteschell continued firing despite
signs of surrender and the crew's effort to evacuate the ships. In
addition, in two instances von Ruchteschell made no effort to rescue
the survivors, thereby effectively condemning the crews to death at
sea.
162
The notes to the case observe that von Ruchteschell was not
charged with an illegal attack, which suggests that it is permissible to
launch an unwarned attack upon a merchantman. This exception to
the rules of sea warfare imposes a duty upon the attacking warship to
limit itself to the employment of adequate force and not to kill or
wound more members of the crew than is reasonably required. Once
the ship is subdued, reasonable steps must be taken to rescue the
crew of both merchant and war ships. The attacking crew is under no
obligation to pursue survivors who prefer the perils of the sea to
capture. The survivors possess a correlative duty to care for their
wounded colleagues and to call attention to their location in order to
facilitate the rescue of the wounded crew. In those instances in
which the survivors reasonably believe that no quarter would have
been given and were reluctant to be rescued, a higher duty rests upon
the attacking vessel to make efforts to save the crew.'63
161. Id at 12.
162. Trial Of Helmuth Von Ruchteschell, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, May 5th-
21st, 1947), IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 82-86 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949)[Von Ruchteschell].
163. Id at 87-88 (Notes on the Case). A war ship may be attacked without
warning. Enemy merchant ships only may be attacked if they refuse the attacking
vessel's request to board. A merchant ship that is armed and integrated into the
naval intelligence service forfeits its immunity from unwarned attack. Id. at 87.
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An attack must cease as soon as an attacked or counter-attacked
vessel indicates she is prepared to surrender. The Court ruled that
the surrender requires the capitulating ship to stop her engines, turn
on her lights, raise a white flag, and respond to an attacker's signals
through wireless communication or, if not possible, through hauling
down the flag or signaling with a flashlight. An attacker may not
create conditions in which signals of surrender cannot be effectively
communicated and then justify a continued attack on the grounds
that such signals had not been received.
164
In the Scuttled U-Boats case, First Lieutenant Gerhard
Grumpelt was convicted of scuttling two U-boats in contravention of
the terms of the German surrender in northwest Germany. The
surrender specified that all ships in the area were to be handed over
to the Allied forces. Four hours before the fighting was to cease, the
German Navy was ordered to scuttle its U-boats. This order was
countermanded in a matter of hours. Grumpelt defied the latter order
and scuttled two U-boats. Both incidents took place on May 6, a day
following the transfer of the ships into Allied control. The scuttling
of the ships contravened the terms of surrender, and was ruled a war
crime.16
5
Article 35 of the Hague Convention provides that capitulations
must be "scrupulously observed by both parties."' 16 6 The Hague
Convention also provides that "a violation of the terms of the
armistice by individuals acting on their own initiative... entitles the
injured party to demand the punishment of the offenders." 67
Surrender, even absent a specific provision prohibiting scuttling,
164. Id at 89-90.
165. Trial Of Oberleutnant Gerhard Grumpelt (The Scuttled U-boats Case), (Brit.
Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Feb. 12-13th, 1946), I L. REPT. TRIALS WAR
CRIM. 55-65 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947).
166. Id at 68 (Notes on the Case) citing and quoting Hague Convention, supra
note 61, at art. 35.
167. Id. citing Hague Convention at art. 41. The accused's mistake of fact
defense was rejected. He was considered to have possessed constructive
knowledge that the scuttle order had been countermanded. Id. at 69-70.
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embodies an implied condition that all war materials will be
surrendered in the same condition it was in at the time the agreement
was signed. Military equipment, however, may be destroyed in
anticipation of surrender. A temporary cessation of hostilities, an
armistice, or a cease-fire, permits a belligerent to augment or
dismantle military equipment outside the immediate battlefield.
However, there is no agreement on the obligations of armies
confronting one another on the battlefield.168
These decisions stand as the single set of World War II war
crimes prosecutions for transgressions at sea. The Nuremberg
Tribunal determined that the Laconia Order did not violate
international law. Mohle was held liable for interpreting this
command so as to countenance and require illegal attacks upon
merchant vessels and a refusal to rescue the crews. The irresistible
inference was that Mohle's addendums had caused thousands of
Allied casualties.169 The Court, in Peleus, recognized, but avoided
addressing the parameters of operational necessity. Eck's plea was
conceived as being based on convenience rather than a concern with
safety. 7° Von Ruchteschell recognized that armed merchant ships
that are integrated into the war effort are subject to limited armed
attacks. An attack must cease following a merchant vessel's
signaling of surrender. There is a duty on the attacking vessel, as
well as on the surviving crew, to take steps to ensure rescue.' The
Court in the Scuttled U-Boats case ruled that the duty to tum over
war material in the same condition in which it was at the time of
capitulation is an implied term of surrender. A domestic order, law,




169. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying texts.
170. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying texts.
171. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying texts.
172. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying texts.
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E. Land Warfare
Two cases raised the novel question of the legality of ruses and
trickery. Otto Skorzeny and nine other officers of the 150th Panzer
Brigade were acquitted of improperly obtaining Red Cross packages
and American uniforms from prisoners-of-war and of making use of
these uniforms to treacherously fire upon United States troops during
combat.
173
Skorzeny was commissioned by Hitler to disguise troops in
American uniforms and to infiltrate United States lines. These
troops were trained in American language, mannerisms, and military
maneuvers. Some of their uniforms, along with Red Cross parcels,
were illicitly obtained from prisoner-of-war camps. Several
witnesses observed Skorzeny's brigade wearing American uniforms
with German parachute overalls in operational areas. However, only
two American soldiers testified that they had encountered German
troops in combat wearing United States uniforms.
74
The Tribunal noted the Hague Convention prohibits the
prosecution of persons engaging in espionage who subsequently
return to their home Army. This immunity extends solely to
espionage, and does not prevent prosecution for other war crimes. 175
The wearing of enemy uniforms during armed combat is prohibited.
Some contend that such uniforms may be utilized to assist in
arriving at the point of attack. The defendants adopted the latter
interpretation, and pled that they planned to reach their objectives
under cover of darkness, discard the American uniforms and fight
173. Trial Of Otto Skorzeny And Others, (United States Gen. Milit. Gov. Ct.,
Aug. l8th-Sept. 9th, 1947), IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 90-92 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1949).
174. Id at 91. Skorzeny's troops were assigned to the Ardennes offensive. Their
objective were the three Maas bridges at Angier, Amee and Huy. This mission
was abandoned due to the German's inability to penetrate enemy lines. Skorzeny
and his unit were then reassigned to an infantry mission and subsequently
disbanded. Id.
175. Id. at 94.
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under their national colors.
176
The Hague Convention provides little guidance. Article 23(f)
prohibits the "improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or
of the military insignia or uniform of the enemy, as well as the
distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention."'77  The question
remains whether the wearing of enemy uniforms at all times is
improper. The Court apparently determined that the Germans had
not fired at American troops, and thus could not be held liable of
having worn the uniforms during combat.1
7 1
The German defendants clearly contravened Article Six of the
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention that safeguards the personal
possessions, including military uniforms, of prisoners of war. They
also violated Article 37, which prohibits the appropriation of
packages sent to prisoners of war. The Court apparently viewed the
latter two offenses as de minimis, and acquitted the defendants.
179
Heinz Hagendorf was convicted of having wrongfully fired a
weapon at United States soldiers from an enemy ambulance
displaying the Red Cross emblem. United States soldiers pursued
and disabled the ambulance, captured Hagendorf, and killed the
driver as he fled from the vehicle. 80
The Hague Convention, as noted, prohibits the improper use of
176. Id at 92 (Notes on the Case).
177. Id. at 93 citing and quoting Hague Convention at art. 23(f).
178. Id. at 93. An American combatant testified that he had fought and captured
several German soldiers wearing American uniforms with German parachute
overalls. The American witness was uncertain as to the unit to which they were
attached. As a result, the prosecution in Skorzeny was unable to connect these
combatants with the 150th Brigade. The accused Kocherscheid admitted firing
several shots at an American military police sergeant while dressed in a United
States uniform. However, there was no evidence that a single American soldier
had been wounded or killed. The Court apparently viewed the latter as an
insignificant offense. Id
179. Id at 94, quoting Geneva Convention at arts. 6, 37.
180. Trial Of Heinz Hagendorf (United States Intermediate Milt. Gov. Ct.,
Dachau, Germany Aug. 8th-9th, 1946), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 146
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Hagendort].
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the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention.' The humanitarian
law of war also accords protection to vehicles equipped for the
evacuation of wounded and sick persons displaying the Red Cross
insignia. As a result, persons displaying the Red Cross insignia may
neither be treated as a combatant nor targeted for attack. Medical
personnel enjoy this immunity so long as they refrain from initiating
acts of armed belligerency. 18
2
The Court rejected Hagendorf's claim that he had acted in self-
defense while in transit to collect wounded Germans. The panel
noted that "the firing of a weapon from an ambulance by personnel
who were themselves protected by such emblems.., in the absence
of an attack upon them... [c]onstituted unlawful belligerency, and a
criminal course of conduct."'18
3
The accused in Thiele argued that they were hiding from the
surrounding American troops, and had no alternative other than to
kill an American prisoner of war. The Court rejected the plea of
necessity, determining instead that conventional and customary rules
may be adjusted only in those instances in which the text provides
for this qualification. The prohibition of killing prisoners of war did
not qualify for such an exception.'84
In Eisentrager, Lothar Eisentrager, head of a German
intelligence agency in China, and various other diplomats and
security agents, were convicted of voluntarily and knowingly
producing propaganda pamphlets and transmitting and failing to
prevent the gathering and transmission of information concerning
American troop movements to the Japanese armed forces. This aid
181. Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art. 23(f).
182. Hagendorf, supra note 180, at 147.
183. Id at 148. "It is hard to conceive of a more flagrant misuse than the firing of
a weapon from an ambulance by personnel who were themselves protected by
such emblems ... in the absence of an attack upon them. This constituted
unlawful belligerency, and a criminal course of conduct." Id
184. Trial of Gunther Thiele And Georg Steinert, (United States Milit. Comm'n,
Augsberg, Germany, June 13th, 1945), III L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-59
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Thiele].
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and assistance was rendered following Germany's unconditional
surrender in violation of the laws and customs of war.'
Article 35 of the Hague Convention stipulates that surrender
must be scrupulously observed and combatants must cease
hostilities.186  Any continuance of the conflict constitutes an
international delict, regardless of the extent of the resulting injury.
The defendants' cooperation with the Japanese clearly contravened
the code of conflict. The appropriate alternative was to claim non-
belligerent status or to seek repatriation to Germany. i8 7
The decision in Eisentrager was unique in that the defendants
had not carried on hostilities in the field of combat following
surrender. Instead, they engaged in military activities in a theater of
war where hostilities were being carried out by a German co-
belligerent. The defendants' conviction suggests that in the event of
surrender, belligerent nationals are not free to continue the conflict
under another banner."8
The defendants were civilian members of the Intelligence
Agency of Germany. The judgment indicates that the terms of
surrender apply to all nationals of the surrendering belligerent, and
are not restricted to members of the armed forces. "This was a
185. Trial Of Lothar Eisentrager, (United States Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, Oct.
3rd-Jan. 14th, 1946), XIV LAW REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 8-14 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Eisentrager].
186. Id at 17, (Notes on the Case) citing and quoting the Hague Convention.
187. Id at 14. The Tribunal acquitted the diplomatic defendants, presumably
determining that they lacked the authority and power to prevent the production of
propaganda and dissemination of intelligence. Id. at 14. There is no indication
that these acquittals were based on the defendants' diplomatic privilege or status.
Id at 22 (Notes on the Case). A stipulated surrender, or capitulation, involves
establishing conditions for surrender. A simple surrender entails an unconditional
cessation of hostilities. The common denominator is that hostilities between the
Parties cease. A breach of this obligation by a State is an international delict, while
a breach by an individual is a war crime. Germany entered into an unconditional
surrender. The Court was able to rely the language of the Declaration of Berlin of
June 5, 1945, that could be interpreted as explicitly prohibiting the dissemination
of intelligence and propaganda. Id at 16-18.
188. Id at2l.
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capitulation not of a mere fortress or a mere army or two; it was
unconditional surrender of all forces under German control and
carried with it all people of the German nation."18 9
Skorzeny affirmed that belligerents could not appropriate and
dress in enemy uniforms during armed combat. It is open to debate
whether such uniforms may be worn in an effort to arrive at the point
of attack. 190 In Hagendorf the American Tribunal further held that
medical personnel protected under the emblem of the Red Cross
shall not employ armed aggression other than in self-defense.'9
Thiele established that the requirements of the humanitarian
law of war shall not be qualified on the basis of necessity. This
defense is admissible only when explicitly incorporated into the code
of conflict. 92 In addition, Eisentrager established that civilians and
combatants shall not assist allied forces or engage in armed conflict
following their country's surrender.1 93
F. Crimes Against Peace
The Nuremberg Charter imposed liability for crimes against
peace, the planning or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties' 94 The International Military
Tribunal noted that war is "essentially an evil thing. Its consequences
... affect the whole world.... To initiate a war of aggression ... is
189. Id. at 22. The Tribunal also broadly interpreted the prohibition on
continuing military activity to encompass activities such as transmitting radio
messages and collecting intelligence, producing propaganda, ordering and
encouraging subordinates to work on behalf of the Japanese, and submitting to
the Japanese a list of raw material and equipment in possession of the German
community so as to enable the Japanese to seize items to be seized. Id.
190. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying texts.
191. See supra note 180-83 and accompanying texts.
192. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 188-89 and accompanying texts.
194. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(a).
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the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." 195
The Tribunal concluded that the high-ranking defendants indicted at
Nuremberg must have been aware they were acting in defiance of
international treaties and law when they intentionally launched wars
of aggression.1 96 Domestic war crimes statutes were generally silent
on the subject of crimes against peace, and only Poland and China
provided for jurisdiction over this delict. 9 7
Takashi Sakai was the Commander of the Japanese 23rd Army
operating in South China. He was convicted of participating in a
crime against peace as well as committing war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The Chinese Tribunal determined that Sakai had
organized and threatened terrorist activities and assassinations
intended to destabilize the local Chinese government and facilitate
the establishment of Japanese rule. He was also found to have
incited and permitted his subordinates to engage in war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 98
The Tribunal concluded that Sakai "was one of the leaders who
were instrumental in Japan's aggression against China,"' 9 9 and that
he was guilty of having "conducted military operations which
formed part of a war of aggression." 00 The Court did not clarify
whether Sakai's conviction was based on the terrorist attacks that he
had organized against China between 1931 and 1939, as well as on
195. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 65, at 427. The seizures of Austria and
Czechoslovakia were listed in the indictment as acts of aggression. The first war
of aggression in the indictment was initiated against Poland on September 1, 1939.
Id. The defendants were convicted of planning and waging aggressive wars
against twelve nations. Id at 459.
196. Id. at462.
197. Polish Law, supra note 24, at 90; Chinese Law, supra note 11, at 152-53.
198. Trial Of Takashi Sakai (Chinese War Crimes Milit. Trib. of The Ministry Of
National Defense, Nanking, Aug. 29th, 1946), XIV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR
CRIM. 1-2 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949).
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id. at 4 (Notes on the Case).
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Sakai's activities following the initiation of formal hostilities in
1939.201 His aggressive acts were determined to have violated the
Nine Power Treaty of 1922, which guarantees respect for the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of China along
with the Pact of Paris of 1928, which condemned recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies.0 2
Artur Greiser was also convicted of a crime against peace.
Greiser served as Deputy Gauleiter of the Nazi Party for the Danzig
district in Poland, and in May 1934 assumed the additional post of
President of the Danzig Senate.0 3 The Tribunal noted that Greiser
was one of the Fuehrer's most enthusiastic and reliable collaborators,
and was involved in a crucial component of the Fuehrer's "unfolding
plan for aggressive war on a world scale."2 °4 He was convicted of
preparing and implementing an aggressive war in violation of the
German-Polish non-aggression pact of January 26, 1934, which
resulted in the German annexation of portions of the Free City of
Danzig, as well as parts of Poland. This was the initial step in
Germany's scheme to incorporate adjoining territories into the Third
Reich so as to provide territory for the resettlement of ethnic
Germans. °s
In the aftermath of World War I, Danzig was organized as a
Free City whose autonomy was guaranteed by the League of
Nations. The National Socialists succeeded in capturing
governmental control in 1933, and over the course of the next five
years, Greiser implemented a program designed to undermine the
city's autonomous and non-partisan character. This program
culminated in Greiser's appointment of Albert Forster as Chief of the
201. Id at 5. The accused's guilt for the acts committed during the period
covering 1931 and 1934 appeared to have been judged under Chinese
municipalities rather than under international law. Id. at 6.
202. Quoted and cited in id at 6.
203. Greiser, supra note 63, at 70.
204. Id. at 104.
205. Id at 74-75.
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"Free State of Danzig" on August 23, 1939. One week later, Forster,
acting on the orders of Adolf Hitler, unilaterally annexed Danzig into
the Reich. This coincided with Germany's September 1, 1939
invasion and subsequent annexation of a portion of occupied
Poland.216
In Rauter, the Netherlands Special Court of Cassation ruled
that international law did not distinguish between occupations that
resulted from legal and illegal conflicts. The Tribunal noted that
"once a war had started, the law makes no distinction between a
lawful or an unlawful war, or between legitimate or illegitimate
occupation."2 7  The rights and duties of the occupants and the
inhabitants are the same in both instances.0 8
The deployment of armed forces has traditionally been viewed
as an essential aspect of sovereignty. The Nuremberg Charter took
the unprecedented step of declaring that the planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of an aggressive war constituted a crime against
peace.0 9 The Chinese Military Tribunal's conviction of Takashi
Sakal for crimes against peace extended the scope of liability
established at Nuremberg, which had limited liability to high
echelon decision-makers. 210 The conviction of lower-level military
officers, such as Sakai, presumed that these combatants possessed
either actual or constructive knowledge that they were engaging in
illegal criminal aggression. n Sakai and Greiser also affirmed that a
crime against peace might take the form of terrorist incidents or the
fulmination of internal unrest and needs to involve large-scale,
conventional military activity. Rauter affirmed that the rights and
206. Id. at 77.
207. Rauter, supra note 33, at 128.
208. Id.
209. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
210. Nuremberg Judgment, supra notes 195-97 and accompanying texts.
211. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying texts.
212. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying texts.
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duties of occupants and inhabitants of occupied territories are
independent of the legality of the armed conflict.
23
G. Protection Of Prisoners of War And Civilians
The Hague Convention contains several provisions pertaining
to the protection of prisoners of war. Article 23 prohibits killing or
wounding an enemy "who, having laid down his arms, or having no
longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion."214 Prisoners
of war215 are to be treated humanely,216 and their maintenance is the
responsibility of the confining power.217  The tasks to which
prisoners are assigned "shall not be excessive and shall have no
connection with the operations of the war."218 Escaped prisoners
who are apprehended prior to rejoining their own army or before
leaving the territory occupied by the detaining army are liable to
disciplinary punishment.2 9 Spies are defined as those who act
clandestinely or on false pretenses in obtaining or endeavoring to
213. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
214. Hague Convention, Annex I, supra note 61, art. 23(c)-(d).
215. Id. at art 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
(1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
(3) To carry arms openly; and
(4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war....
Id. These requirements were subsequently modified. Hague Convention, Protocol
I, supra note 104, art. 44(3).
216. Hague Convention, Annex I, supra note 61, art. 4.
217. Id. at art. 7.
218. Id at art. 6.
219. Id. at art. 8.
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obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent with the
intention of communicating to the hostile party. A spy may not be
punished without a previous trial.22°
The Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War states
that prisoners are considered to be in the power of the hostile
custodial government, and "must at all times be humanely treated
and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public
curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited."221 The
detaining power is obligated to provide for the maintenance of
prisoners of war.222 Prisoners must be evacuated, within the shortest
possible period following their capture, to a safe and secure region.
They shall not be needlessly exposed to danger while awaiting
2evacuation. 2 Prisoner of war camps are required to provide sanitary
living conditions22 and prisoners shall be provided adequate food,
225
clothing,226 and medical attention.227  The Geneva Convention
repeats that labor furnished by prisoners shall have no direct relation
with operations of war. Captors are prohibited from using prisoners
of war for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions and for
transporting material intended for combat units.228 Arrest is the most
severe disciplinary punishment that may be imposed on a prisoner.
The duration of a single punishment may not exceed thirty days.229
220. Id. at art. 29.
221. Geneva Convention, supra note at 39, art. 3. "Prisoners of war have the
right to have their person and their honor respected." Id.
222. Id. at art. 4.
223. Id. at art 7.
224. Id at arts. 10 and 13.
225. Id. atart. 11.
226. Id. at art. 2.
227. Id. at art. 14.
228. Id at art. 31.
229. Id. at art. 54. Punishments for separate offenses shall be separated by a
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A number of prosecutions pertained to the killing of prisoners
of war. Defendant Max Wielen, head of the Criminal Police in
Breslau, was convicted, along with several Gestapo officers, for
involvement in the killing of escaped prisoners of war. Wielen was
summoned to Berlin where he was instructed that more than half of
those apprehended were to be executed. He subsequently handed
twenty-seven of the thirty-six prisoners apprehended within his
jurisdiction over to the Gestapo with full knowledge that they would
be executed. Wielen then returned to Berlin and helped orchestrate
the concealment of the killings. The urns containing the ashes of
fifty murdered officers were sent to Wielen, who returned them to
Stalag Luft III with the explanation that the prisoners had been shot
while attempting to escape."O
In the Almelo Trial, three German combatants were accused of
murdering a British airman whom Dutch nationals were hiding. The
pilot, whose plane had been shot down, was clothed as a civilian
when apprehended. The notes to the case show that the airman's
execution could not be justified absent a judicial determination that
the pilot was a spy. The British Tribunal also rejected the superior
orders defense, holding that combatants are expected to be familiar
with the legal formalities required for the carrying out of a death
sentence. The Court also rejected the defense of duress, dismissing
the contention that the defendants were motivated by a concern for
their personal safety.231
In the Drierwalde Case, Oberfeldwebel Karl Amberger was
sentenced to death for executing four prisoners of war. All four had
been shot through the head. Amberger claimed that the prisoners
had attempted to escape. However, one witness testified that
Amberger had vowed to kill the prisoners prior to escorting them to
a detention camp. The Judge Advocate instructed the Court that a
combatant who possesses actual or reasonable grounds to believe
period of at least three days. Id
230. Wielen, supra note 78, at 20-36, 39-40. The Court rejected the mistake of
fact defense, determining that the defendants should have been aware that the
captured prisoners were entitled to a trial. Id. at 50-51 (Notes on the Case).
231. See Almelo, supra note 16, at 45; see also Rhode, supra note 56, at 54.
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that a prisoner is attempting to escape may utilize reasonable force to
restrain the prisoner. The guard should strive to shoot to wound, but
this is flexibly applied and the death of an escapee does not
ordinarily constitute a war crime. The privilege of using deadly force
is based on the presumption that the escaping prisoner may
constitute a potential belligerent. The Court, however, found no
factual support for Amberger's escape defense.232
In Buck, German combatants were accused of executing six
British airmen, four American prisoners of war, and four French
nationals. The British Court determined that the defendants were
aware that the prisoners had not been provided with the required trial
prior to their execution. Were the defendants justifiably ignorant of
this requirement? Should they have complied with orders to execute
the prisoners? The Judge Advocate instructed the Court that the
defendants, as non-lawyers, may not have been familiar with the
requirements of multi-national conventions and could not be
expected to possess a book on military law. Nevertheless, the Court
assumed that "men who are serving either as prisoners or in
proximity to soldiers know as a matter of the general facts of
military life whether a prisoner of war has certain rights and whether
one of those rights is not, when captured, to security for his
person."2
33
232. Trial Of Karl Amberger (The Dreierwalde Case), (Brit. Milit. Ct.,
Wuppertal, March llth-14th, 1946), I L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 81-82,
86-87 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter
Amberger]. The Judge Advocate noted that it is the duty of a captured combatant
to attempt to escape. The corollary is that the detaining power is entitled to
prevent the individual's escape. Id. at 86 (Notes on the Case).
233. Buck, supra note 16, at 44. (Notes on the Case). The defendants contended
that they believed the security police subjected the victims to a trial. The
prosecution pointed out that lawful executions do not ordinarily take place in the
woods, and that the victims' remains are not customarily buried in bomb craters
with their valuables, clothing, and identity markings removed. Id. at 43 (Notes on
the Case). On the privilege to use force to prevent the escape of prisoners, see also
Trial Of Karl Adam Golkel And Thirteen Others, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal,
Germany, May 15th-21st, 1946), V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR Crim. 45 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Golkel]. Premeditation may arise instantly
and spontaneously. An accused's act need not be the sole cause of death--it is
sufficient if the act contributed to the death. Insanity is recognized as a defense in
prosecutions of war crimes. See Trial Of Peter Back, (U.S. Milit. Comm'n,
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A United States Tribunal, in Bury, directly addressed the
legality of superior orders to execute prisoners of war. Two police
officers were convicted of unlawfully killing an American airman.
The defendants claimed that they had received orders that "terror
flyers" were not entitled to prisoner of war status and were to be
summarily executed. The Tribunal dismissed the superior orders
defense, determining that the accused had not been explicitly ordered
to execute the airman. The Court stated that an unlawful act
committed pursuant to an order is not justified if the combatant
actually knew or reasonably should have known that the order was
unlawful under the laws and customs of war, the principles of
criminal law generally prevailing in civilized nations, or the laws of
his own country. International principles take precedence over the
domestic legal code in cases of conflict.2
34
Others were convicted of illegally employing or abusing
prisoners of war. Max Schmidt, a German medical officer in France,
severed the head from a dead American airman and placed the skull
on his desk. He later sent the skull to Germany as a souvenir. The
American military Court ruled that belligerents possess an obligation
to safeguard and honorably bury or cremate the dead.235 He was
convicted and imprisoned for ten years.
Lieutenant Tanabe Koshiro was adjudged guilty and sentenced
to seven years imprisonment as a result of his employment of Dutch,
American, Australian, and British prisoners of war in the
construction of an ammunition depot adjacent to a prisoner of war
camp. The depot was filled with ammunition and surrounded with
artillery, exposing the prisoners to an Allied aerial attack. Flimsy air-
Ahrweiler, Germany, June 16th, 1945), III L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 60-61
(U.N. War Crimes Commtn, 1948)[hereinafter Back].
234. Trial Of Albert Bury And Wilhelm Hafier, (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Freising,
Germany, July 15th, 1945), III L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 62-64 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Bury].
235. Trial Of Max Schmid, (United States General Milit. Gov. Ct., Dachau,
Germany May 19th, 1947), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 151-52 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Schmid]. Graves also are to be properly
marked. Id at 152 (Notes on the Case).
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raid shelters were provided which were constructed of rotten trunks
of coconut palms, tattered timber, and thin sheets of dilapidated
zinc.236 Koshiro was convicted of using prisoners for war-related
work and exposing prisoners to Allied bombing attacks. Koshiro's
acts violated Japan's legal obligations as a signatory to the Hague
Convention, as well as its duties under the customary laws and
usages of war that were embodied in the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention.23
7
Lieutenant General Kurt Maelzer was convicted by a United
States Military Commission for obeying an order to parade two
hundred American prisoners of war through the streets of Rome. The
crowd jeered and threw sticks and stones. The accused threatened to
shoot those prisoners who responded with defiant gestures.
Photographs of the prisoners marching under the threat of German
bayonets appeared in the press. Maelzer was convicted of breaching
his duty to safeguard the prisoners.238
There were also examples of successful criminal defenses.
Police officers Erich Weiss and Wilhelm Mundo were acquitted of
killing an American airman. Weiss claimed that he had been
threatened by the airman's movement of his hand towards his
pocket, so he shot in self-defense. Mundo's back was turned and
upon hearing a shot, turned and also fired. There was no evidence
that the victim had been subsequently searched to determine whether
he was armed.239
236. Trial Of Tanabe Koshiro, (Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial, Macassar,
Feb. 5th, 1947), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1-4 ( U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1948)[hereinafter Koshiro].
237. Id. at 4 (Notes on the Case).
238. Trial Of Lieutenant General Kurt Maelzer, (United States Milit. Comm'n,
Florence, Sept. 9th-14th, 1946), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 53 (United
States Milit. Comm'n, Florence, Sept. 9th-l4th, 1949) [hereinafter Maelzer].
239. Trial Of Erich Weiss And Wilhelm Mundo, (United States General Milit.
Gov. Ct., Ludwigsburg, Germany, Nov. 9th-10th, 1945), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS
WAR CRIM. 149-150 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Erich
Weiss].
Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals
Arno Heering was convicted of failing to provide prisoners
with sufficient food, adequate billets, and medical supplies. In
addition, Heering was convicted of mistreating prisoners and
marching prisoners excessive distances. The prosecution argued that
Heering's threat to shoot prisoners who left the column, as a result of
exhaustion or illness, constituted mental cruelty. The Judge
Advocate, however, instructed that the warnings had been directed to
guards rather than to prisoners, and that mere words could not
constitute an assault.24 °
Which individuals are entitled to be treated as lawful
belligerents and, upon capture, considered to attain prisoner of war
status? Colonel Karl Bauer ordered the execution of three captured
French partisans. All three were captured while fighting in
accordance with the rules of warfare and were adorned with a
tricolor strap around their arm. Bauer was sentenced to death, and
those who carried out his orders received five years'
imprisonment.24'
The Hague Convention requires that lawful combatants serve
under a commander; wear a fixed, distinctive sign; carry arms
openly; and conduct operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.242 Article Two extends belligerency status to the
unorganized inhabitants of an unoccupied territory who
spontaneously take up arms upon the approach of the enemy. These
individuals are required to openly carry arms and respect the laws
and customs of war.243 Territory is considered occupied when
240. Trial Of Arno Heering, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hanover, Jan. 24th-26th, 1946), XI
L. REPT. TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 79-80 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949)
[hereinafter Heering]. Words might constitute inhumane treatment if they amount
to mental cruelty and interfere with the health or well-being of the prisoners. Id. at
80 (Notes on the Case).
241. Trial Of Carl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck And Herbert Falten, (Penn. Milit.
Trib., Dijon, Oct. 18, 1945), VIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 15 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1949)[hereinafter Bauer].
242. See Hague Convention, Annex I, supra note at 61, art. 1.
243. Id atart. 2.
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subordinated to the authority and control of a hostile army.
244
The French Tribunal appears to have concluded that the
partisans were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and were
entitled to have their guilt determined at trial. What was the basis of
this determination? Invading French troops and indigenous partisan
forces challenged German forces in Bauer. The resulting
deterioration of the Third Reich's command and control may have
resulted in the Court's determination that the relevant territory should
no longer be considered occupied. Additionally, the rapidly
expanding and increasingly disorganized partisan forces were
encompassed within the spontaneous uprising exception. However,
the Tribunal may have considered that the partisans qualified as
lawful combatants because they were under the command of the
regular French forces, openly carried arms, and were variously
adorned with tricolor straps, helmets, and khaki overalls. The latter
view was problematic since the tricolor straps would not appear to
satisfy the distinctive military symbol requirement of the Hague
Convention.245
In Hangobl, a United States military court convicted Josef
Hangobl, a member of the non-uniformed Austrian home guard, of
killing a downed American pilot. The trial record was ambiguous as
to whether the American pilot was attempting to escape, resist, or
surrender. The Court seemed to have determined that Hangobl did
not satisfy the requirements of lawful belligerency and only was
entitled to exercise armed force in self-defense. Also, the Tribunal's
decision may have been based on a determination that Hangbol was
a lawful belligerent and had employed unnecessary and excessive
force.24
6
In sum, defendants were convicted for the execution of
prisoners of war without trial. Both police and military personnel
were expected to be aware of the requirement that those accused of
244. Id at art. 42.
245. Bauer, supra note 241, at 16-19 (Notes on the Case).
246. Trial Of Josef Hangobl (Gen. Milit. Ct., Dachau, Germany, Oct. 17th-18th,
1945), XIV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 86-88 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1949).
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war crimes are entitled to a judicial adjudication of their guilt.247
While reasonable force may be used to restrain a prisoner attempting
to escape, this standard is flexibly interpreted and the prisoner
assumes the risk that escape may result in death.248 Those who
escape and are later apprehended are subject to imprisonment, but
may not be executed.249 Other defendants were convicted of
mutilation of the dead, illegal employment of prisoners in war-
related activities, exposing prisoners to danger, and of failure to
safeguard prisoners from public humiliation.250 Individuals satisfying
specified organizational and uniform requirements were entitled to
the status of lawful belligerents.2
It also is a crime to mistreat or kill civilian inhabitants of
occupied territories. The Hague Convention requires an occupying
power to respect inhabitants' "[flamily honor... rights... lives...
and private property, as well as religious convictions and
1 252practice.
In the Zykion B case, industrialist Bruno Tesch and his
assistant, Karl Weinbacher, were convicted of knowingly providing
as much as two tons of Zyklon B poison gas each month to
concentration camps. An estimated six million people were
exterminated, four and a half million in Auschwitz/Birkenau alone.
The Court determined that the size of the shipments, company
documents, and reported conversations, indicated that the defendants
were aware that Zyklon B was being used to exterminate, rather than
to disinfect, inmates. The defendants were sentenced to death,
affirming that the humanitarian law of war extends liability to
247. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying texts.
248. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 235-3 8 and accompanying texts.
251. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying texts.
252. Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277.
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civilians as well as to members of the military.253
In Becker, nineteen defendants were convicted of the illegal
arrest and mistreatment of French nationals. Illegal arrests, although
punishable under the French Penal Code, are not explicitly
condemned under the Hague Convention. The French Court ruled
that systematic arrests are encompassed within the Martens Clause
which provides, in part, that inhabitants "remain under the protection
and governance of the principles of the laws of nations, derived from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience."254 The Court
noted that "[i]t is not disputable that 'indiscriminate mass arrests' are
a violation of the . . .penal law of civilized nations .. . [and]
represent.. .'systematic terrorism." 25 '
In several cases, defendants were convicted of mistreating
inhabitants of occupied territories in violation of the Hague
Convention.256 Additionally, this mistreatment was enumerated as a
war crime under the Nuremberg Charter 57 as well as Control
Council Law No. 10.258 The French Criminal Code punished the
infliction of wounds, blows, or other acts of violence. The penalty
253. Zyklon B, supra note 53, at 102.
254. Trial Of Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, (Perm. Milit. Trib.,
Lyon, July 17, 1947), VII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 67, 68 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Becker] citing Hague
Convention, supra note 61, at preamble (Martens Clause). Such arrests are not
required to be undertaken in a systematic and mass fashion in order to fall within
the prohibitions of the French Penal Code. Id. at 69 (Notes on the Case).
255. Id at 68-69 (Notes on the Case).
256. Id at 70, citing Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art. 43 (duty of
occupant to ensure public safety and to respect the laws of the occupied territory)
and 46 (obligation to respect family honor and rights and individual life). Physical
mistreatment is also encompassed within the Martens Clause of the Hague
Convention. Id citing Hague Convention, supra note 61, at preamble.
257. The Nuremberg Charter prohibits the "ill-treatment of civilian population in
occupied territory." Id Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(b).
258. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 5, at art. II(1)(b).
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was conditioned upon the degree of resulting harm. A French Court
applied these domestic and international provisions in convicting the
defendants in Becker of the severe beating and other physical
mistreatment of French nationals.5 9
In Bruns, the defendant, Richard Bruns, and two co-defendants,
were convicted of deploying various methods of torture to carry out
interrogations--cold baths, blows and kicks, and the application of
leg screws. The Court acknowledged that the defendants were
motivated by patriotic zeal and had acted in response to superior
orders. The Tribunal also recognized that these techniques had been
effective in combating the resistance. However, such atrocious
conduct by an invading army could not be'excused. "If a nation,
which without warning has attacked another, finds it necessary to
use such methods to fight opposition, then those guilty must be
punished, whether they gave the orders or carried them out."2'60
Defendant Wilhelm Gerbsch was convicted by the Special
Court in Amsterdam of seriously mistreating Dutch citizens and
nationals of other European States who had been deported to the
penal camp in which Gerbsch served as a guard. He was one of the
few defendants convicted of a crime against humanity, which
encompasses "inhumane acts committed against a civilian
population."2 '' This charge was based on the fact that Gerbsch was
charged with the abuse of nationals of various European states and
the Netherlands' legislation limited war crimes to only acts directed
against Dutch nationals. Crimes against humanity also were directed
against the type of systematic acts of abuse undertaken by
Gerbsch.262
259. Becker, supra note 254, at 69-70 (Notes on the Case).
260. Bruns, supra note 82, at 18. "The Court could not believe that a State, even
Nazi Germany, could force its subjects, if they were unwilling, to perform such
brutal and atrocious acts as those of which the defendants were guilty." Id.
261. Gerbsch, supra note 41, at 133-36 (Notes on the Case).
262. Id at 136. Mistreatment was also a crime under the Netherlands East Indies
(N.E.I.) criminal code. In Motmura, Shegeki Motomura, head of Tokkeitai in the
South-West Celebes, was convicted of ordering, tolerating, and engaging in
unlawful arrests and systematic torture against the civilian population. Trial Of
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In Chusaburo, the defendant, a sergeant in the Imperial
Japanese Army, was convicted of killing a civilian resident of Kuala
Lumpur. Hostilities had ceased, but the Tribunal ruled that
violations of the laws and usages of war committed during the
process of surrender and disarmament remained war crimes.
Chusaburo had caught Omar, a civilian, stealing rice from the
storehouse. In the course of stealing the rice, Omar killed the victim
during a scuffle with seven or eight individuals who were attempting
to wrest Omar from Chusaburo's grasp. The Tribunal determined
that Omar did not lose his civilian status as a result of his criminal
activity. The loss of civilian status required taking up arms and
committing hostilities against the enemy. The theft of rice did not
fall within this category of activity.
Additionally, the Court failed to find that drunkenness or
provocation would sufficiently allow for a reduced conviction of
manslaughter or that it would sustain the defendant's plea of self-
defense. The notes to the case observe that there is a dispute as to
whether the humanitarian law of war distinguishes between
homicide and manslaughter.2
63
Washio Awochi, a Japanese innkeeper, was convicted of
recruiting and subjecting Dutch women to enforced prostitution in
the Netherlands East Indies. Women as young as twelve were
required to meet a monetary quota or face imprisonment, deportation
or abuse at the hands of the Japanese military police.2"4
Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Reich Governor of Alsace, was
convicted of inciting, recruiting, and conscripting French nationals to
Shigeki Motomura and 15 Others,(Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial at
Macassar, July 18th, 1947), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 138, 143-44
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949). Illegal detention was treated as an inhumane
act that constituted a crime against humanity when carried out against Jews based
on their race and religion. See Zuehlke, supra note 38, at 145.
263. Trial Of Yamamoto Chusaburo, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Kuala Lumpur, Jan 30th-
Feb. 1, 1946), III L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 76-80 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1948) (Notes on the Case).
264. Trial Of Washio Awochi, (Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial at Batavia,
Oct. 25, 1946), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 122 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949).
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bear arms against France.265  Hitler authorized Wagner to draft
Alsatians in order to inculcate the occupied population with respect
for their new Fatherland. Those who failed to fulfill their military
obligation were subject to arrest and deportation to the Reich. This
policy was ruthlessly implemented. Deserters and resisters were shot
and their families were dispossessed and deported to Germany. 66
In sum, domestic court decisions affirmed that civilians were
entitled to protection against arbitrary killing, abuse, and
mistreatment by a foreign or occupying power.267
H. Concerned In Killing And Mistreatment
British military courts extended accessory liability to those
charged with being concerned in the killing of prisoners and
civilians. 68 The Judge Advocate, in Golkel, advised that the concept
of this accessory liability was to be broadly interpreted, and
instructed that "[i]t is for the members of the Court to decide what
participation is fairly within the meaning of those words."2 69
In Wielen, the Judge Advocate clarified that:
the persons concerned must have been part of the
machine doing some duty, carrying out some
performance which went on directly to achieve the
killing, that it had some real bearing on the killing,
would not have been so effective or been done so
expeditiously if that person had not contributed his
265. Wagner I, supra note 34, at 40.
266. Id at 28-30. The French criminal code punished the recruitment of French
combatants to fight on behalf of a foreign power during wartime. Id. at 51 (Notes
on the Case).
267. See supra note 252-66 and accompanying texts.
268. See Wielen, supra note 78, at 46 (Notes on the Case).
269. Gokel, supra note 234, at 53 (Notes on the Case).
1999-2000]
68 INT'L & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
willing aid.270
The Wielen Court adjudged defendants who had issued the order to
kill, fired the fatal shot, acted as an escort, or drove the victims to the
site of the execution to be guilty. The Court also attached liability to
those issuing the orders, despite the fact that they were not present at
the scenes of the executions. All of the defendants were sentenced to
death, with the exception of two drivers, who witnessed the killings
and received ten years in prison, presumably based on their minor
role and limited knowledge concerning the circumstances
surrounding the executions.2 '
In Rauer, Major Karl Rauer, his adjutant Hauptmann Wilhelm
Scharschmidt, and five subordinates, were convicted of being
concerned in the killings of five Allied airmen who were captured
following an attack on an aerodrome at Dreierwalde, Germany.
Those detailed by Scharschmidt to escort the airmen to a prisoner of
war camp, executed the prisoners while in transit, and reported that
the airmen had been shot while attempting to escape. Rauer and
Scharschmidt were acquitted of this charge, but were convicted of
the killings of prisoners under similar circumstances on two
subsequent occasions. There was no evidence that either of the two
principal defendants had issued orders to kill the prisoners.
However, they failed to take steps following the initial killings to
insure that there was no repetition of this type of incident. Rauer and
Scharschmidt also made no effort to investigate the killings. The
Judge Advocate instructed that the charge of being concerned in
killing did not encompass negligence. Instead, the charge required a
"complete and direct allegation that Rauer was either instigating
murder or condoning it. 272
270. Wielen, supra note 78, at 46 (Notes on the Case). The Judge Advocate did
advise that "I do not think the prosecution can ask you to consider a case of a
minor official who was concerned with some administrative matter." Id.
271. Id.
272. Rauer, supra note 142, at 116 (Notes on the Case). The other defendants
were convicted and sentenced to death based upon their direct involvement in the
killings. Id. 114.
Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals
In Rhode, Commandant Fritz Hartjenstein and six others were
convicted of being involved in the lethal injection of four Allied
female prisoners, three of whom were British and the remaining one
French. The women were falsely informed that they were receiving
typhus injections, and their bodies were immediately cremated
following their deaths. Only medical officer Werner Rohde had
been present at the killings. The defendants were nevertheless
convicted based on having countenanced, administered, and/or
participated in organizing the extermination and/or disposal of the
bodies. The Judge Advocate instructed that it was not necessary for
an individual to be present for that individual to be convicted for the
killings. He provided an example of two men who undertake a
murder, one of whom stands guard one-half mile from the actual
killing. Although the latter "was not actually present when the
murder was done, if he was taking part ... with the knowledge that
that other man was going to put the killing into effect, then he was
just as guilty as the person who fired the shot or delivered the
blow.1273
The British military court in Killinger convicted three former
Lutfwaffe officers for being parties to the illegal interrogation of
British prisoners of war. The Tribunal interpreted the phrase
"concerned together as parties to the ill-treatment of British prisoners
of war" to require that an individual possess knowledge of the abuse,
and yet refrained from intervening to prevent these practices.7
In Oenning, defendant Emil Nix ordered his subordinate,
Johannes Oenning, to eliminate a prisoner of war, and then assisted
in secretly burying the victim. Nix clearly harbored the criminal
intent to kill the victim, and subsequently assisted in covering up the
crime.
275
273. Rhode, supra note 56, at 54, 56 (Notes on the Case). The accused could not
be legally executed absent a trial. Id. at 58 (Notes on the Case).
274. Killinger, supra note 142, at 69 (Notes on the Case). The Court required an
intentional rather than negligent failure to act. Id. (Notes on the Case).
275. Trial Of Johannes Oenning and Emil Nix (Brit. Milit. Ct., Borken, Germany
Dec. 21st-22nd, 1945), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 74-75 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (hereinafter Oenning).
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The charge of being concerned in killings was relied upon to
impose accessory liability on those who countenanced, planned, or
ordered killings, as well as those who carried out, condoned, and
covered up illicit executions or interrogations. Individuals who
performed a minor role were not held criminally culpable. The
prosecution was required to demonstrate that a defendant acted with
the intent to kill, mistreat, or assist in the victims' killing or
mistreatment. Negligent conduct was not sufficient.2
76
Other domestic courts merely applied the basic principles of
accomplice liability. In Becker, for instance, the accused were
convicted of having caused, "without intent to inflict it," the death of
those he was responsible for deporting to Germany.277
I. Genocidal Crimes
Poland brought three middle-ranking German occupation
authorities to trial under the Decree of August 31, 1944, as amended
by the Decree of February 16, 1945, concerning the punishment of
Fascist-Hitlerite criminals guilty of murder and ill-treatment of
civilian population, et al. The Decree punished any person who, in
assisting the German authorities:
(a) took part in committing acts of murder, ill-
treatment or persecution against the civilian
population or prisoners of war;
276. See supra notes 268-75. (In Schonfeld, the four accused were ordered to
apprehend three Allied airmen believed to be in hiding in a house operated by the
Dutch Resistance. The accused, Michael Rotschopf, killed the airmen, claiming at
trial that he had shot them in order to prevent their escape from the German
Security Police. The Judge Advocate instructed that the defendants could be
found guilty of being concerned in the killings under alternative theories. The four
could be found guilty as principles in the first or second degree or for involvement
in a common plan to commit murder. A third approach imposed a presumption of
guilt on those involved in a concerted plan. The Judge Advocate also instructed
that actions subsequent to the killings did not create liability.) See Schonfeld,
supra note 36, at 68-73 (Notes on the Case).
277. Becker supra note 254, at 70 (Notes on the Case).
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(b) acted to the detriment of persons wanted or
persecuted by the authorities of occupation for
whatever reason it may be (with the exception of
prosecution for common law crimes), by sentencing,
detaining or deporting them .... 27
These acts also violated Article 46 of the Hague Convention which
provides that "[f]amily honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must
be respected. 279
The prosecution charged that the defendants' acts amounted to
genocide, that is, the destruction of a nation or a national group. The
notes to the Goeth case clarify that genocide entails attacks against
individuals due to their membership in a national group. This
clarification does not necessarily require the immediate destruction
of a collectivity. It also encompasses the disintegration of economic,
cultural, political, religious, and social institutions, as well as attacks
on the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and lives of
individuals. The first phase of genocide, the denationalization or the
destruction of the national pattern of an oppressed group, typically is
accompanied by a second phase that entails the imposition of the
national pattern of the dominant group.28 °
Amon Leopold Goeth, an Austrian member of the Nazi Party
and Waffen SS (military arm of the security police), was charged
with ordering and participating in the deprivation of freedom,
mistreatment, and extermination of Jews and Poles. His actions
278. Quoted in Trial Of Haupsturmfuhrer Amon Leopold Goeth, (Sup. Nat'l
Trib., Cracow, Aug. 27th-31st Aug. & Sept. 2nd-5th, 1946), VII L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 7 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Notes on the
Case)[hereinafter Goeth]. (The decree also abrogated the superior orders
defense. "The fact that any of the crimes envisaged in Articles 1 and 2 of the
Decree was committed while in service of the enemy authority of occupation or
on its orders, or under duress, does not exempt from criminal responsibility.")
Id at 10 (Notes on the Case).
279. Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art. 46.
280. Goeth, supra note 278, at 7-10 (Notes on the Case).
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were described as part of a series of coordinated actions aimed at the
extermination of these groups. Goeth, with the assistance of security
police experts on Jewish affairs, initiated the final liquidation of the
Krakow ghetto on March 13, 1943. Approximately four thousand
people were murdered, some of whom were personally shot by
Goeth. The remaining ten thousand people were forced into the
Plaszow labor camp. The next step was the liquidation of the
Tarnow ghetto in September 1943. Goeth himself killed between
thirty and ninety women and children, and sent roughly ten thousand
Jews to Auschwitz by rail. Only four hundred arrived alive.
281
Between September 1943 and February 1944, Goeth liquidated
the forced labor camp at Szebnie. He ordered the murder or
deportation of inmates to other camps, resulting in the death of
several thousand prisoners. Goeth also served as Commandant of the
forced labor camp at Plaszow (Krakow) between February 1943 and
September 1944. During Goeth's tenure, he caused the death of
roughly 8,000 inmates, ordering a large number to be
exterminated.282  The Tribunal noted that "[t]he wholesale
extermination of Jews and also of Poles had all of the characteristics
of genocide in the biological meaning of this term, and embraced in
addition the destruction of the cultural life of these nations. 283
Goeth was sentenced to death.2 4
Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of the Auschwitz Camp between
May 1940 and October 1943, was the second person accused that
was convicted of genocide. Auschwitz was perhaps the most
infamous of the nine concentration camps established by the Third
Reich. Roughly four million Jews, Poles, and Russians were
exterminated within the institution. As many as sixty thousand
people were asphyxiated in gas chambers each day, and another
twenty-four thousand were immolated daily in the crematoria.
Those who were not exterminated were subjected to unsanitary
281. Idat3.
282. Id at 1.
283. Id at 9 (Notes on the Case).
284. Id at 4.
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conditions, inadequate food, forced labor, wholesale robbery, and
other forms of mistreatment.285
Hoess, in addition to being held liable for the deprivation of
human life, was also convicted of carrying out involuntary medical
experiments. These experiments included castration, premature
termination of pregnancy, sterilization, artificial insemination, and
intrusive anti-cancer surgical procedures. The experiments involved
procedures ranging from massive X-ray treatment, injections of large
amounts of fluids into the uterus and fallopian tubes, radical
amputations, surgical excisions, and transplantations. Hoess was
sentenced to death.286
The Supreme National Tribunal observed that one of the aims
of the Nazi Party was the biological and cultural extermination of
subjugated nations, especially the Jewish and Slavic nations. This
was intended to facilitate the territorial expansion of Germany. The
Tribunal noted that the Third Reich's policy constituted "the crime of
genocide . . .an attempt on the most organic bases of the human
relationship, such as the right to live and the right to existence."2 7
The medical experiments were aimed at achieving the most
appropriate means by which to reduce or destroy the reproductive
power of the "non-German nations which were considered by the
Nazis as standing in the way of the fulfillment of German plans of
world domination. Thus, they were preparatory to the carrying out
of the crime of genocide."288 Furthermore, "[T]hey constituted the
preparatory stage of one of the forms of the crime of genocide,
which was intended to be perpetrated by scientific means."28 9
285. Hoess, supra note 47, at 12.
286. Id at 14-16. These experiments were often performed by unqualified
doctors in appalling conditions. They did not serve any valid scientific purpose,
and resulted in unnecessary suffering and injury. The victims experienced extreme
pain, torture, permanent injury, and death. Id at 25 (Notes on the Case).
287. Id. at 24 (Notes on the Case).
288. Id at 25 (Notes on the Case).
289. Id at 26 (Notes on the Case).
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The third genocide trial was directed against Gauleiter and
Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of the Warthegau, Artur Greiser.
Greiser was prosecuted for acts violative of the August 31, 1944
Decree and the Hague Convention, and was sentenced to death.
In 1941, Greiser wrote that the Wartheland (western Poland)
was to be cleansed of Poles, resettled by Germans, and transformed
into a granary for the support of the Greater Reich. The Poles were
to be deported into the Governor General (eastern Poland), and the
Jews were to be exterminated.290
Greiser issued and implemented regulations intended to
subordinate the Wartheland to Germany, reduce Poles to slave
laborers, and cleanse the incorporated territories of Jews. These
measures included the confiscation of property, limitations on
marriage, deprivation of employment, deportation to slave labor,
establishment of German schools, the arrest and extermination of
clergy, the closing of churches, and the imposition of a criminal code
that severely punished antagonism to the Third Reich. The
intelligentia was imprisoned and exterminated, Polish books and
periodicals were seized, cultural centers were closed, and
monuments and research centers were destroyed.291
In 1940, Greiser initiated what the Tribunal characterized as the
"systematic humiliation and insulting of the Polish nation, and...
every sort of prohibition and order was employed to lower its
standard of living, fertility, and strength., 29 2  Germans and Poles
290. Trial Of Gauleiter Artur Greiser (Sup. Nat'l Trib., Poland, June 21st-July
7th, 1946), XIII L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 70, 71, 97 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949)[hereinafter Greiser]. See Hague Convention, supra note 61, at
arts. 43, 46-47, 50, 52, 55 & 56 cited in id. at 71. These acts were also in violation
of the provisions of the Polish Penal code of 1932 pertaining to complicity in
murder, grievous bodily harm, torture, and ill treatment. Greiser, id. at 107 (Notes
on the Case).
291. Id. at 78-85. Poles, for instance, were required to work at the age of
fourteen. They were to receive no more than eighty percent of the wage paid to
German workers. Holidays were not to be granted, and the working day was to be
a minimum of ten hours. There was no additional remuneration for overtime,
night, or Sunday work. Id at 85. Greiser wrote that "Germans are the lords, and
Poles are the servants." Id at 98.
292. Id at 89.
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were segregated. Shops were required to cater to Germans. Poles
were to be served only during a limited number of hours. Poles were
required to tip their hats, to defer to Germans on the footpaths, and
were prohibited from using public transportation. Poles who
engaged in sexual relations with Germans were subject to the death
penalty.2
93
Several concentration camps for political prisoners were
established within the Wartheland. The internees were beaten,
mistreated, and killed. Greiser possessed the power of life and death
over the inmates, and personally ordered the execution of between
fifty and one hundred Poles for each German killed.9
Greiser singled out Jews for repression and extermination. This
action included encouraging and organizing disappearances,
conducting arbitrary searches and seizures, detaining Jews for
compulsory labor, burning synagogues, defiling cemeteries, and
seizing items of artistic value. Jews were completely cleansed from
the Wartheland and deported into the General Government (eastern
Poland), where they were ghettoized and subsequently
exterminated.295
The Tribunal concluded that Greiser had launched a program of
forced Germanization. This program was accomplished through
physical and spiritual genocide, the deportation of Jews and Poles,
the indoctrination of physically suitable Polish children into German
culture, the mass extermination of the population, and the complete
destruction of Polish culture and institutions.296 According to the
Court, Greiser was not merely a cipher. He independently ordered,
countenanced, and facilitated a systematic program to weaken the
resistance and exterminate the Polish population.297 This constituted
293. Id. at 89-90.
294. Id. at 92-93.
295. Id at 94-95.
296. Id at 114 (Notes on the Case).
297. Id. (Notes on the Case).
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a "general totalitarian genocidal attack on the rights of the small and
medium nations to exist, and to have an identity and culture of their
own. 298
In sum, the three Tribunals catalogued a series of crimes
contrary to the Hague Convention and the "principles of the law of
nations and the postulates of humanity and the conscience of
nations. 29 9 These acts, both separately and combined, were
considered to constitute genocide as well as a crime against
humanity.30
0
The Tribunals described the first phase of genocide as entailing
the disintegration of the Polish population through the destruction of
its national, social, cultural, and economic institutions and the
extermination of portions of the populace. The second phase
involved the Germanization of the remaining population--inculcating
biologically suitable children into German culture and providing for
German emigration into Poland.30 ' Most acts alleged against the
accused occurred during the first phase. These included the
segregation and subordination of Poles, repression of religious
institutions and practices, attacks on culture and learning, economic
exploitation of the population and resources, deportation of the
Polish population, internment, torture, extermination, and the torture
of Jews. 302
298. Id Greiser's defense of superior orders was rejected. Article 4 of the
Decree of August 31, 1944 abrogated the superior orders and duress defenses. Id
at 117 (Notes on the Case).
299. Id. at 71. The articles of the Hague Convention which were contravened
cover such concerns as enacting and changing existing laws; respecting the rights
of families and religious convictions; confiscating private property; imposing
collective responsibility and the requiring of civilian labor other than for the needs
of the army of occupation; and seizing or destroying historic monuments and
works of science and art as well as religious, charitable, scientific, and artistic
institutions. See Hague Convention, supra note 61, at arts. 43, 46-47, 50, 52, and
56.
300. See Goeth, supra note 278, at 7-8 (Notes on the Case).
301. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. See Greiser supra note 290, at
113. (Notes on the Case).
302. Greiser, supra note 290, at 112-13 (Notes on the Case). "It should be noted
that these are exactly the general characteristics of the crime of genocide, the
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Goeth was convicted of both personally killing and ordering
the execution and deportation of the occupied population. The Court
noted that this constituted biological genocide, which resulted in the
destruction of the cultural life of Jews and Poles.303 Rudolf Hoess, as
Commandant of Auschwitz, helped further the Nazi persecution and
extermination of various ethnic and religious groups at the
Auschwitz concentration camp. He directed and condoned the
extermination of approximately four million Jews through
asphyxiation, shootings, hangings, lethal injections, systematic
starvation, and excessive work. Hoess was also involved in
mistreating and torturing inmates and supervising the wholesale
robbery of property. The unique contribution of the Hoess case was
the determination that the medical experiments conducted on
inmates constituted biological genocide through scientific means,
thus extending the definition of genocide to include preparations for
the prevention of births.30 4 Artur Greiser both was Reichsstadthalter
(governor) and Gauleiter (party leader) of Wartheland. He ordered,
condoned, and encouraged the systematic enfeeblement of the Polish
people. The Tribunal ruled that Greiser had committed both
physical and cultural genocide, which broadened the crime to
encompass attacks on the intellectual, political, religious, and social
life of a community.0 5
These cases extended liability to those who participated in,
ordered, or knowingly tolerated the commission of criminal activity.
Liability was imputed to Greiser for both ordering and sanctioning
the detention, torture, extermination, and destruction of Polish
cultural institutions."' Hoess was convicted of participating in
murder and acting to the detriment of inmates by confining them in a
notion of which has been discussed in some detail in connection with other trials
reported in this series." Id. at 113 (Notes on the Case).
303. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying texts.
304. See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying texts.
305. See supra note 290-98 and accompanying texts.
306. See Greiser, supra note 290, at 115-16.
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camp where they were subjected to mistreatment and robbery.0 7
Genocide is defined as a criminal intent to exterminate a
group.30 8 This mental element was not explicitly established as a
requirement for conviction under the August 1944 Decree. 9
However, the Polish Tribunals demonstrated that the defendant's
intent was demonstrated through their statements, 310 the nature and
purpose of their criminal activity,31' awareness of the Reich's
genocidal plans,3 12 and the presumption that the accused were aware
of the connection between their actions and the Reich's ultimate
genocidal aspirations.3 1
3
Tribunals also utilized expert witnesses to document the impact
of the accused's criminal conduct. For instance, the prosecution in
Greiser presented a demographics expert whose calculations
concluded that the accused had been "personally responsible for the
loss to the Polish nation of two million people in the Wartheland, as
well as for the loss in the natural increase in population by
200,000.,,314 The Tribunals dismissed the defendants' superior
orders defense, determining that the accused exercised initiative in
307. Hoess, supra note 47, at 17-18 (Notes on the Case).
308. See Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
309. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
310 Greiser, supra note 290, at 97.
311. Hoess, supra note 47, at 25 (Notes on the Case). The medical experiments
clearly were aimed at the prevention of births. Id.
312. Id (Notes on the Case).
313. Goeth, supra note 278, at 2, 4. "Amon Goeth . . life career from the early
years was inseparably bound with the Nazi movement, and . . . [he] was
responsible for the atrocities committed as part of a general pattern of the German
policy aiming at complete extermination of the Jewish population in Europe." Id.
314. Greiser, supra note 290, at 101 (Testimony of Dr. St. Waszak, Director of
the Statistical Office in Poznan).
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carrying out their crimes"5 and knowingly implemented and issued
clear legal orders.316
J. Military Justice And Occupation Courts
A central contribution of post-war domestic trials was the
specification of due process standards for occupation courts.
Gauleiter Robert Wagner served as head of the civil government of
Alsace during the German occupation. He regularly intervened in
the administration of justice by instructing the Prosecutor and
President of the Special Court as to the verdict and penalties to be
imposed in various prosecutions. 7 Wagner was later convicted of
murder and complicity in murder, and was sentenced to death.
Wagner's powerful influence was demonstrated in the case of
Theodore Witz. Witz was a young Alsatian who was tried and
convicted of the illegal possession of an antiquated firearm. Wagner
dismissed the prosecutor's plea that Witz was an impetuous youth
who should be sentenced to four or five years in prison. Instead,
Wagner ordered Witz "to be executed. Urgent."3 ' The Special
Court sentenced Witz to death, and Wagner rejected the prosecutor's
plea for a modification of the sentence.1 9
In a second case, fourteen Alsatians who allegedly killed a
frontier guard while attempting to escape to Switzerland were
brought to trial. The accused were only informed of the charges
against them and permitted to meet with their appointed attorney a
few hours prior to trial. They were neither advised of their rights to
request a supplementary inquiry into the charges, nor of their rights
to present witnesses and designate an attorney. Wagner also
315. See Goeth, supra note 278, at 10.
316. See Greiser, supra note 290, at 114-116.
317. Wagner I, supra note 34, at 25. There is no recorded instance in which
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reportedly conferred with the Chief Judge, Public Prosecutor, and
Head of Security Services on the eve of trial.320
The prosecutor conceded in his closing argument that there was
no evidence that the accused had been responsible for the death of
the guard. He contended that the defendants deserved the death
penalty and the accused were quickly dispatched to the executioner.
One victim who was mistakenly included in the execution roster
signed by Wagner was an underage minor who had been confined in
a mental institution.321
Wagner was not a disinterested observer. His initial intention
was to execute the Alsatians without a trial, and he only agreed to
the proceedings on the condition that they be initiated within twenty-
four hours. Wagner was so confident of a conviction that he issued a
command to the Gestapo to execute the detainees prior to trial.322
Wagner was convicted of complicity in the murder of Witz and
the thirteen Alsatians, but the French Tribunal determined that the
evidence did not clearly establish that he had been complicit in the
juvenile's execution.323 Chief Judge Richard Huber, President of the
Special Court at Strasbourg, was tried in absentia. Herber was also
found complicit in murder and was sentenced to death. Prosecutor
Ludwig Luger successfully invoked the superior orders defense.324
Concurrently, a series of prosecutions of Japanese officers and
combatants established legal standards governing the war crimes
prosecution of captured belligerents. In Sawada, Major-General
320. Id
321. Id at32.
322. Id Wagner also ordered the execution of Allied prisoners without trial. In
addition, he was instrumental in establishing the Schirmeck concentration camp, in
which several hundred were executed and others were exterminated. Id. at 33.
323. Id at 40. The name of the juvenile Muller had been inserted in the place of
defendant Brungard on the petition for mercy, which Wagner rejected. The list
contained thirteen names, yet fourteen individuals were executed. The roster was
corrected following the executions. The Court presumably viewed this as an
unfortunate error rather than as a deliberate scheme. Id. at 32.
324. Id at 42.
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Shigeru Sawada, former Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial 13th Expeditionary Army in China, was convicted of
prosecuting eight United States pilots on false and fraudulent
charges. For example, the pilots were downed and captured by
Japanese forces in April 1942, and were subjected to interrogation
and torture during fifty-two days in solitary confinement. The
Americans were then brought before several officers, including
defendants Second-Lieutenant Okada Ryuhei and Lieutenant Wako
Yusei, who they later learned had constituted a court-martial. The
pilots were not aware at the time that they were being subjected to
trial, or that charges were being lodged against them. The defendants
sat passively as the accusations were read in Japanese. They were
neither provided the opportunity to enter a plea nor to be represented
by counsel. The prosecution did not offer witnesses or evidence and
the proceedings were not transcribed. 25
Pursuant to Tokyo's request, the trial was delayed until the
issuance of the Enemy Airmen's Act in August 1942. This specified
that pilots who attacked any non-military targets or violated
international law were subject to a possible death sentence, which
might be commuted by the court to a term of imprisonment.
Following the hearing, a staff officer arrived with orders from Tokyo
instructing the Court to impose the death penalty. The Tribunal
considered the evidence for an hour and dutifully returned a verdict
of guilty. The death sentences were later modified in response to
Tokyo's decision that only three should be executed and five
condemned to life imprisonment of the pilots.3 26
The Japanese Tribunal was appointed and served under the
command of General Shigera Sawada, Commander of the 13th
Army, headquartered in Shanghai. Sawada was absent from
headquarters during the prosecution. Upon his return in September
1942, he reviewed the trial and protested to General Hata,
Commanding General of the China Forces, who responded that
325. Sawada, supra note 49, at 2-3. The defendants contended that a report of
the damage resulting from Allied bombing as well as the flyers' alleged
confessions were read in court. There was no evidence that these purported
confessions were genuine. Id. at 3.
326. Id. at 3-4.
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Tokyo was responsible for the severe sentences. Sawada made no
further efforts to suspend or mitigate the punishments handed out by
the Court.3
27
The fourth accused, Captain Tatsuta Sotojiro, was warden of
the Kiangwan Military Prison in Shanghai and was responsible for
the execution of the three fliers. Tatsuta was acquitted of murder--
the Tribunal determined that Tatsuda possessed neither actual nor
constructive knowledge of the nature of the trial. However, Tatsuta
was adjudged responsible for depriving the surviving prisoners of
heat and adequate clothing, food, and health and hygiene supplies.328
Sawada was acquitted of failing to commute, remit, and revoke
the sentences. This acquittal appears to have been based on the fact
that he protested the Court's decision to his immediate superior. The
Tribunal presumably did not require that Sawada bring his
objections to the attention of the Tokyo command. Although he had
been informed that the pilots were receiving the same treatment
accorded to Japanese officers in prison, Sawada was sentenced to
five years of hard labor for failing to intervene to insure that the
Americans were protected from mistreatment.329
Wako and Okada were convicted of depriving the defendants
of life and liberty without a fair trial. Wako was the law member of
the Military Tribunal. Yet, he unquestioningly followed orders,
accepted the purported confessions, and voted to impose the death
penalty. As a result he was sentenced to hard labor for nine years.
Okada possessed no legal training, initially resisted serving as a
judge, and, like Wako, followed instructions in giving out capital
punishment. He was sentenced to five years of hard labor. Tatsuta
followed orders in denying the prisoners the treatment to be
accorded prisoners of war. Despite the lack of evidence that Tatsuta
personally abused or mistreated the prisoners, he was sentenced to
five years of hard labor.3
327. Id at 4.
328. Id. at 6.
329. Id. at 7-8.
330. Id The relatively light sentences appear to reflect the fact that the three
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The notes to the Sawada case catalogue several aspects of the
trial which contributed to the Japanese Court's criminal character: a
failure to specify the charges; the denial of counsel, an interpreter,
and the right to examine the evidence and to take the stand; reliance
on false and fraudulent allegations and evidence; and the judges'
failure to conscientiously examine the documents submitted to the
court.
33 1
In Ohashi, an Australian Tribunal convicted two Japanese
military police officers, Sergeant-Majors Shigeru Ohashi and
Yoshifunii Komoda, of issuing and assisting in carrying out a
judicial order to behead eighteen civilian inhabitants of New Britain.
The evidence indicated that the Japanese government had
authorized summary trials to combat unrest in occupied territories
such as New Britain. Unit commanders were accorded discretion as
to the convening, constitution, and penalties to be meted out by the
field courts.332
The eighteen New Britain defendants pled guilty to conspiring
against the armed forces of Japan. They were denied counsel, but
were permitted to address the Court and were provided with an
interpreter. The two prosecution witnesses testified for roughly four
minutes and the Court conferred for approximately ten minutes
before returning a guilty verdict. Sihigeru Ohashi, Yoshifumi
Komoda, and a third judge adjourned for an additional ten minutes
before sentencing the defendants to death. The Provost Marshal,
Colonel Kikuchi, immediately confirmed that the trial had been fair.
The executions were carried out an hour later. Ohashi and Komoda
were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. This was later
commuted to imprisonment for two years. The other defendants
low-ranking defendants acted pursuant superior orders. Id. at 13 (Notes on the
Case).
331. Id. at 12-13 (Notes on the Case).
332. Ohashi, supra note 48, at 25-26. The accused allegedly concealed weapons,
stole grenades and rations, blew up a petrol dump, and attacked a Japanese civilian
and a Japanese soldier. Id at 25. Offenses in occupied territory ordinarily would
have been prosecuted before a court martial. However, an April 1944 Declaration
provided unit commanders with the discretion to convene a summary tribunal
rather than a court martial. Id. at 25-26.
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were acquitted. Although they had been involved in carrying out the
executions, they were adjudged to have been unaware of the illicit
character of the court proceedings.333
The Australian Judge Advocate instructed that charges of
treason in time of war might be prosecuted before a military court or
such other court as the occupant may assemble. International law
specifies neither the constitution nor the procedures that are to be
followed. But, the trial must conform to the fundamental principles
of justice. Although the defendants pled guilty to war treason, the
Australian Court determined that the trial had failed to conform to
the requirements of international law. These procedures, according
to the Judge Advocate, include that reasonably informed judges act
in good faith, informing the accused of the charges and evidence, a
fair evaluation of the evidence, and punishment that does not outrage
the sentiments of humanity."'
In Isayama, eight officers attached to the Japanese Formosan
Army were convicted by an American Military Commission for the
mistreatment and false trial of fourteen United States airmen. The
333. Id. at 26. The Japanese alleged that they had acted in a summary fashion
based on their fear that the local population would make an effort to rescue the
incarcerated conspirators. The third judge--the accused's superior, Lieutenant
Yamada-who was not indicted. Id
334. Id at 28, 30-31 (Notes on the Case). In Shinohara, three Japanese officers
were convicted of failing to provide a fair and proper trial to two natives of
Kanbanguru. The prosecutor claimed that five factors must be considered:
whether there was an impartial tribunal; whether the accused was informed of the
charges prior to trial; whether some evidence was presented against the accused;
whether the right against self-incrimination was respected; and whether the
accused was provided the right to call witnesses and speak in mitigation. The
Judge Advocate noted that there was sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to retum
a guilty verdict. However, the proceedings failed to fulfill the standards for a fair
and proper trial. The President of the Court had determined that the accused was
guilty prior to trial. In addition, the charge sheet was translated into Pidgin
English, which was not understood by the accused. On the other hand, the
defendant had pled guilty and had been extensively interrogated by the Court. The
Australian Court sentenced the accused to five years in prison, but this was not
confirmed by the reviewing authority. Trial Of Captain Eitaro Shinohara And Two
Others, (Aust. Milt. Ct., Rabaul, March 30th-April 1st, 1946), V L. REPT.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 32,34-36. (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
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airmen were prosecuted under the infamous law of October 12,
1944, that punished enemy airmen who engaged in the
indiscriminate bombing and strafing of Japanese civilians and
forces.335
The lead defendant, Lieutenant-General Harukei Isayama,
Chief of Staff of the 10th Area Army, received instructions from
Tokyo to prosecute the captured American airmen under the Enemy
Airmen's Act and to impose severe punishments. Harukei Isayami
proceeded to instruct his subordinates to prepare the cases for trial.
Several interrogation records were falsified to incriminate the
defendants, and these fraudulent admissions were then introduced at
trial.
3 36
The accused were not afforded the opportunity to obtain
evidence or to be represented by counsel. The trials were conducted
in Japanese, and only the enumeration of the charges was translated
into English. All fourteen defendants were convicted on the basis of
the contrived confessions as well as police investigations of the
bomb damage. Tokyo instructed the military tribunals that death
was the appropriate penalty, and on June 19, 1945, the American
fliers were lined up in front of an open ditch, shot to death, and
buried in the trench.33
7
Colonel Seiichi Furukawa and Lieutenant-Colonel Naritaka
335. Trial Of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama And Seven Others, (United
States Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, July lst-25th, 1946), V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR
CRIM. 60 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948). Defendants were subject to trial
before a military tribunal composed of three judges--two ordinary army officers
and one judicial officer--who were to be appointed by the commander. The Act
punished enemy airmen who carried out any of the following: bombing and
strafing, with intent to kill, wound or intimidate civilians; bombing and strafing
with intent to destroy or bum private objectives of non-military nature; bombing
and strafimg non-military objectives other than in unavoidable circumstances;
disregarding human rights and carrying out inhuman acts; or entering into the
jurisdiction with the intent of carrying out any of the foregoing. These acts were to
be punished by death, but depending on the circumstances, this could be reduced
to either imprisonment for ten years or life. Id. at 61.
336. Id at 61-62.
337. Id. at 62-63.
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Sugiura were sentenced to death. Their sentences were subsequently
commuted to life imprisonment. Seiichi Furukawa was head of the
Judicial Department and chief prosecutor. He was responsible for
instructing the judges and superiors on the relevant law and facts,
particularly the culpability of radiomen and photographers, under the
theory of accomplice liability. Following the Japanese surrender,
Seiichi Furukawa directed prosecutors to modify the interrogation
records so as to give the appearance that there was little doubt
concerning the defendants' guilt. Naritaka Sugiura served as chief
judge in the prosecutions. He also was a member of the Intelligence
Department, and was involved in interrogating the airmen prior to
their being turned over to the Judicial Department for
investigation.338
Harukei Isayama and Captain Yoshio Nakano were sentenced
to life imprisonment. Harukei Isayma served as liaison with Tokyo,
discussed the decision with the judges and members of the judicial
department, and monitored the progress of the prosecutions. He was
also responsible for preparing and filing the order of execution.
Yoshio Nakano was an associate judge in the trials and, as a member
of the Intelligence Department, was involved in the interrogations.339
Two military judges, Jitsuo Date and Ken Fujikawa, were convicted
and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The latter two verdicts were
not confirmed by the Reviewing Authority, which had failed to find
that the defendants had been aware that the evidence against the
airmen had been fabricated. Masaharu Matsui and Tadao Ito had
been involved in interrogating the airmen, and were convicted and
sentenced to terms of forty and twenty years in prison,
respectively.
The notes to the case point out that the trials failed to meet the
requisite standards of fairness. The most glaring omissions included
reliance on false evidence, the denial of counsel and interpretation,
denial of the opportunity to obtain evidence or witnesses, and the
338. Id at 63-64.
339. Id.
340. Idat 64.
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summary nature of the proceedings.341
In Hisakasu, six Japanese officers were convicted of
participating in the illegal trial and unlawful killing of United States
Major Houck, whose plane was shot down during an air raid on
Hong Kong harbor. During his interrogation, the Major denied that
he had intentionally attacked a thirty-ton Chinese civilian vessel and
caused the death of eight Chinese nationals.342
The evidence presented by the prosecution at trial consisted of
two reports on damage to the vessel and a record of Houck's
interrogation in which he denied culpability. At trial, Houck also
disavowed attacking the ship. Following the proceedings, the judges
unanimously voted for the death penalty.343
General Tanaka Hisakasu, Governor General of Hong Kong
and Commanding General of the Japanese 23rd Imperial
Expeditionary Army at Canton, had delegated full authority over
Hong Kong to his Chief of Staff, Major-General Fukuchi Haruo.
Tanaka Hisakasu had cautioned Fukuchi Haruo about taking action
against Houck. Fukuchi Haruo requested and obtained permission
from Tokyo to conduct the trial. He then directed the preparation of
evidentiary reports and endorsed the judgment of death without
seeking the required approval from Tanaka Hisakasu. There was no
evidence that Tanaka Hisakasu had ordered or participated in the
trial or that he was aware that the sentence would be carried out
without his personal approval.344
Lieutenant-Colonel Kubo Nishiga and Major Watanabe
Masamori served on the judicial tribunal, and relied on the judgment
of Captain Yamaguchi Koichi. Yamaguchi Koichi was an
experienced legal officer and had insisted on Houck's guilt. Both
lay members admitted that they had not been compelled to adjudge
341. Id at 65 (Notes on the Case).
342. Trial Of General Tanaka Hisakasu And Five Others, (United States Milit.
Comm'n, Shanghai, Aug. 3-Sept. 3, 1946), V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 66
(U.N. War Crimes Conm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Hisakasu].
343. Id at 67.
344. Id at 68-69.
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the defendant guilty, and Watanabe Masamori further conceded that
the trial had been unfair.3"'
Prosecutor Captain Asakawa Hiroshi was acquitted due to the
Court's finding that he had acted at the direction of his superior Shii,
who had committed suicide prior to the American prosecution.
Tanaka Hisakasu and Fukuchi Haruo were sentenced to death, Kubo
Nishigai and Yamaguchi Koichi were condemned to life
imprisonment, and Watanabe Masamori to fifty years in prison. The
Confirming Authority refused to ratify Tanaka Hisakasus sentence,
and commuted Fukuchi Haruo's punishment to life and Kubo
Nishigai and Watanabe Masamori's sentences to imprisonment for
ten years. The commutation of Tanaka Hisakasu's sentence
presumably was based on his absence during the trial and his
purported lack of knowledge concerning the character of the
proceedings. Houck's trial resembled that of other American airmen
because he was provided neither defense counsel nor an opportunity
to prepare a defense or to secure witness. Furthermore, witnesses
were not presented to corroborate the charges. The entire trial lasted
two hours, suggesting that the verdict was reached in a summary
fashion.
346
In Latza, the Norwegian Supreme Court affirmed a decision by
the Eidsivating Lagmannsrett (Court of Appeals) that acquitted Hans
Paul Heimuth Latza, President of the Standgericht (Special
Tribunal), and Reinhold Regis and Christian Kehr, assessor judges.
The indictment alleged that the prosecution presided over by Latza
constituted an illicit act of reprisal in which the five victims had been
sentenced to death and executed under legal provisions that were
contrary to the laws and customs of war.347
345. Id. at 69.
346. Id at 70-71 (Notes on the Case).
347. Trial Of Hans Paul Helmth Latza And Two Others (Eidsivating
Lagmannsrett and the Supreme Court of Norway, Feb. 18th, 1947-Dec. 3rd 1948),
XIV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 49 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n
1949)[hereinafter Latza]. Latza was convicted, and the two other defendants,
acquitted by the Lagmannsrett in March 1947. The Supreme Court quashed the
verdict and ordered a new trial. The re-trial before the Eidsivating Lagmannsrett
resulted in the acquittal of all three defendants in January 1948. The Supreme
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Latza was named head of a Standgericht (Special Court), which
had been established by Hitler following the assassination of the
German Chief of Police in Oslo. Four Norwegians who were
viewed as the intellectual inspirations behind the Norwegian
resistance were immediately arrested, brought to trial, and sentenced
to death. Six alleged saboteurs were also subsequently brought to
trial and condemned to capital punishment. A seventh defendant,
Aage Martinsen, was convicted of failing to denounce his two
brothers-in-law, both of whom had allegedly participated in
sabotage-related activities. All eleven were executed in February
1945.348
The Lagmannsrett held that there were no express provisions in
international law regulating the minimum court procedures to be
provided by an occupying power. In the opinion of the Norwegian
Court of Appeals, the Standgericht's procedures had been fair and
unbiased, and there was no evidence that German officials had
influenced the Standgericht's rulings. The accused had been
informed of the charges against them, and were provided an
opportunity to testify on their own behalf. The evidence also
sustained the convictions since there was proof that various
defendants were active in the underground. The accused were not
provided counsel, but there was no indication that they had requested
representation.
The prosecution relied on reports by the German police and
unnamed Norwegian collaborators. However, the prosecution's
reliance on direct testimony was not adjudged violative of proper
procedures because this reliance was not an indispensable principle
of international law. The Lagmannsrett further concluded that the
sentences meted out by the Stangericht were not disproportionate to
the defendants' crimes. The imposition of punishment was a matter
of discretion, and the Court could not be faulted for seeking to deter
and incapacitate the Norwegian resistance.3' 9
On the other hand, the Norwegian Supreme Court believed the
Court upheld the judgment and findings of the Lagmannsrett in December 1948.
Id at51.
348. Id at 54-56.
349. Id at 68-70.
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Standgericht's procedures were questionable. However, the Court's
findings were not entirely decisive. The determining factor was that
"there had been a fair trial before independent judges who delivered
their judgment according to their free conviction. . . The
Standgericht went through each and every charge with the accused
and... they were given full opportunity to explain themselves....
[T]he accused ...had partly admitted charges brought against
them."'35  In addition, the Supreme Court noted that occupation
courts had understandably imposed severe punishments in order to
stem the Norwegian resistance.35" '
In sum, the Norwegian Supreme Court found that impartiality,
the opportunity to present evidence, and the grounding of a
conviction on sufficient evidence were the indicia of a fair trial. The
Court did not find it controlling that the prosecution had failed to
memorialize the charges in writing prior to trial, relied on indirect
evidence, neglected to provide counsel to the accused, and that the
reviewing authority provided only cursory review.352 The Supreme
Court's conclusion seemingly overlooked the fact that the
Standgericht had been explicitly established to eliminate opposition
forces, and that Latza had close and continuing contacts with high-
ranking Nazi officials prior to trial. The Norwegian Courts also
deferred to German sovereignty in adjudging the propriety of the
penalties and punishment meted out to the Norwegian defendants.
Yet, the activities of five of the seven intellectual leaders were
benign, ranging from anti-German propaganda and financially
assisting the underground to assisting the escape of Jews and
political dissidents. Only two defendants, those involved in
smuggling arms, clearly were engaged in war treason.3
An additional issue addressed by domestic tribunals was
350. Id at 82. The questionable procedures included the failure to specify the
charges in writing, the absence of defense counsel, the indirect nature of the
evidence, the summary nature of the proceedings, and the superficial review
provided by the superior officer. Id. at 81.
351. Idat83.
352. Id. at 81.
353. Id. at 53-57.
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whether the citizens of occupied countries were obligated to comply
with German law and denounce individuals opposed to the Third
Reich. The United Nations War Crimes Commission adopted the
position that an act of denunciation was not a delict. Only an illicit
arrest, torture, or deportation that resulted from the denunciation was
punishable. A different approach was adopted under French
municipal law, which treated denunciation as an independent crime
regardless of the consequences. The French Ordinance of January
31, 1944, defined "denunciation" as providing information
concerning individuals who either were active in the resistance or
who refused to cooperate with occupation authorities. Denunciation
also included reporting the commission of "acts punishable under the
laws of the French quisling administration, when such laws were not
confirmed by the French Government after the war, as well as acts
for which an amnesty had been granted or which had entailed
punishments quashed by higher courts. 354
A Permanent French Military Tribunal convicted German
citizen Jean-Pierre Lex for having denounced and instigated the
deportation and looting of seventeen French families.355 Similarly,
in Latza, the defendants were charged for having illicitly convicted
defendant Aage Martinsen, a Norwegian police officer, because he
did not denounce his brother-in-laws whom he allegedly was aware
were involved in sabotage. The Norwegian Supreme Court ruled
that it would have been more consistent with the laws of humanity
and dictates of public conscience for the panel to have refused to
impose a punishment. Sanctioning this conduct appeared contrary to
the prohibition, which required the population of an occupied
territory to take part in war operations against their own country.
Nevertheless, the Norwegian Supreme Court noted that respectable
354. Becker, supra note 254, at 72 (Notes on the Case). The United Nations War
Crimes Commission standard punished denunciation under the law of complicity.
Id.
355. Trial Of Jean-Pierre Lex, (Perm. Milit. Trib., Nancy, May 13th, 1946), VII
L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 74 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948). Lex was
a German citizen residing in Peltre who worked as assistant to the Secretary of the
Town Hall. Lex informed occupation authorities that the families were guilty of
having used the French language and of conducting anti-German propaganda. Id.
1999-2000]
92 INT'L & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
scholarly authorities had adopted the position that a duty to
denounce may attach to imminent acts undertaken by irregular
combatants that are inconsistent with international law. The lack of
a clear consensus on the permissibility of punishing denunciation
persuaded the Court that the best course was refusal to convict the
defendants on this count.356
In sum, the accused in the American prosecutions were
convicted of denying certain basic safeguards that were recognized
by all civilized nations as essential to a fair trial.357 These rights
were considered to arise from Article 2 of the Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention, which is declaratory of customary international
law. This article provides an independent source of due process
guarantees.358 The Australian trials affirmed that similar rights must
be provided in the trial of civilian inhabitants of occupied territories
accused of war crimes.359 The fact that trials before occupation
courts provided the same level of protection as were guaranteed to
persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power did not
constitute a defense. A state may not rely on municipal law to avoid
its international obligations.36 °
There is no talismanic formula as to the rights required.
However, the impartiality of the Tribunal appears central.361 The
Judge Advocate, in Ohashi, advised that "[t]he Court should satisfy
itself that the accused is guilty before awarding punishment... but
there must be consideration by a tribunal ... who will endeavor to
judge the accused fairly upon the evidence.., honestly endeavoring
to discard any preconceived belief in the guilt of the accused or any
prejudice against him.36  Those, such as Robert Wagner, who
356. Latza, supra note 347, at 82-83.
357. See supra notes 335-41 and accompanying texts.
358. See Hisakasu, supra notes 342, at 73 (Notes on the Case).
359. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying texts.
360. Hisakasu, supra note 342, at 72-73 (Notes on the Case).
361. See supra note 350 and 352 and accompanying texts.
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intervened to influence judicial decisions along with individuals who
complied with these commands and perverted the judicial process,
were adjudged complicit in murder.363
The other requisites for a fair trial include the presentation of
false and fraudulent charges and facts, the provision of counsel,
interpretation, and the opportunity to testify and address the court.
Other essentials include informing the accused of the charges,
providing an opportunity to examine documents, and insuring that
the trial is sufficiently lengthy to permit an adequate presentation
and investigation of the facts.3 '
The Judge Advocate in Ohashi noted that the punishment
"should not be one which outrages the sentiments of humanity."365
For instance, Wagner and two others were adjudged guilty of murder
for sentencing Theodore Witz to death for possession of an
antiquated firearm.366  However, Norwegian panels were
distinguished by the deference they paid to the discretion of
occupation courts. They accepted the use of the death penalty on
those who had engaged in anti-German propaganda, financially
supported the resistance, or sheltered Jews and political dissidents. 67
Most of those convicted were once judges.36 Some, however,
were lay members,369 and others served as law representatives370 or
362. Quoted in Hisakasu, supra note 342, at 75 (Notes on the Case).
363. See supra notes 317-24 and accompanying texts.
364. See supra notes 331 and 334 and accompanying texts.
365. Quoted in Hisakasu, supra note 342, at 75 (Notes on the Case).
366. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying texts.
367. See supra note 349 and 351 and accompanying texts.
368. See Hisakasu, supra note 342, at 77 (Notes on the Case). Jitsuo Date and
Ken Fujikawa did not have their sentences confirmed. See supra note 340 and
accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 330 and 345-46 and accompanying texts.
370. Id.
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as Chief Judge.37 Courts appeared reluctant to convict prosecutors,
presumably believing that they had only carried out the orders of
superiors and were not responsible for denying defendants due
process or meting out punishment. For example, in Hisakasu,
Asakawa Hiroshi was indicted for having acted as prosecutor in a
trial that resulted in the death of an American airmen. But, he was
determined to have acted under the direction of Prosecutor Shii and
was acquitted by the Tribunal.372 Also in Isayama, Seiichu
Furukawa was convicted, but his conviction appeared to have been
partially based on his role in falsifying interrogation records.373
Judges were acquitted or leniently punished when they were
unaware of the false and fraudulent nature of the proceedings and
had reached an independent decision. 4 The sentences of the two
lay judges in Hisakasu were commuted to ten years in prison.
However, Yamaguchi Koichi, the law member of the judicial panel,
was sentenced to life imprisonment.375 Judges were also acquitted or
given lenient sentences when the denial of fair procedures did not
prejudice the defendants. For example, in Shinohara, the evidence
indicated that Captain Eitaro Shinohra had determined that two
civilians accused of war treason in the South Pacific were guilty of
war treason prior to trial. However, the accused admitted guilt and
received some of the requisites of a fair trial.376 The defendants in
Ohashi also pled guilty and, despite the flawed trial procedures,
Judges Shigeru Ohashi and Yoshiumi Komoda had their sentences
changed to two years in prison.377
371. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 346 and accompanying text. Prosecutor Ludwig Luger was
acquitted in Wagner. See supra note 324.
373. Hisakasu, supra note 342, at 78 (Notes on the Case). See supra note 338 and
accompanying texts.
374. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying texts.
376. See Shinohara, supra note 334, at 32-34. The accused's sentence of five
years in prison was not confirmed. Id. at 34.
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Two military officers with command authority over the
proceedings initiated against the Allied victims, Major-General
General Shigeru Sawada and General Tanaka Hisakasu, were
acquitted. Tanaka Hisakasu was absent from his headquarters during
the trial. He neither possessed a basis for doubting the fairness of the
trial nor a reason to believe that the sentences would be carried out
without his consent. The Confirming Authority refused to confirn
Hisakasu's conviction.37 Sawada, on the other hand, was informed
of the harsh sentences meted out against the American airmen on his
return to headquarters. He protested the penalties to his superior
officer, and was acquitted on the complicity in murder charge. 9
Persons carrying out executions who lacked criminal intent
were acquitted. In Ohashi, the accused were determined to have
taken part in the execution of the eighteen civilians, but only the two
who had acted as judges were adjudged guilty. The interpreter, as
well as four of the executioners who were adjudged to have been
unaware of the illicit nature of the proceedings, were acquitted. 8
The reviewing authority in Sawada refused to confim, the conviction
of Sotojiro Tatusuta for knowingly causing the death of three United
States prisoners. The writ of execution appeared to be facially legal
and, while Tatusuta briefly visited the courtroom, there was no
conclusive proof that he had possessed either actual or constructive
knowledge of the illegality of the trial.
81
377. See supra note 332-34 and accompanying texts.
378. See supra notes 344 and 346 and accompanying texts.
379. See supra notes 327 and 329 and accompanying texts. Sawada also
possessed jurisdiction over the prison in which the victims had been incarcerated
under dire conditions. He was convicted of failing to intervene to prevent their
mistreatment. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying texts.
380. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying texts.
381. See supra notes 328 and 330 and accompanying texts. Those executioners
convicted in other trials typically acted despite the absence of evidence that a trial
had been conducted and often attempted to conceal the killings, suggesting that
they realized the criminal nature of their conduct. See supra notes 231-34 and
accompanying texts.
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K. Membership In Criminal Organizations
Article Nine of the Nuremberg Charter authorized the
International Military Tribunal to declare German organizations
criminal. The competent national authority of any Signatory was
authorized under Article Ten to criminally prosecute those who
knowingly belonged to such organizations. The criminal character
of these groups or organizations was considered established and not
subject to challenge. This process was intended to ease the burden
of proof placed upon prosecutors and expedite the prosecution of
Nazi activists.3
82
A criminal organization, according to the International Military
Tribunal, is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that both involve
"cooperation for criminal purposes. 383 The requisite requirement is
that "[t]here must be a group bound together and organized for a
common purpose. The group must be formed or used in connection
with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter.""38
Knowingly having membership in such organizations was
considered criminal. Those who lacked awareness of an
organization's criminal purposes or acts as well as those who were
conscripted into such organizations were excluded from criminal
liability unless personally implicated in the commission of crimes
condemned in the Nuremberg Charter.38
5
The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, Gestapo, and SD
(Security Police), as well as the SS (Security Service), were declared
criminal. However, no such declaration was issued in regards to the
SA (party para-military, abolished in 1934), Reich Cabinet, or
German General Staff and High Command.386 The Tribunal noted
that the Reich Cabinet had not convened after 1937 and the
membership was so modest that individual prosecutions could be
382. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at arts. 9-10.
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conducted.38 7
The Polish Decree of August 31, 1944, in Article Four,
punished membership in criminal organizations.388 The Supreme
National Tribunal of Poland ruled that while it was bound by the
findings of the International Military Tribunal, the Nuremberg
Charter authorized the Supreme Tribunal to declare additional
organizations criminal s.3 9 The Supreme Tribunal explained that the
rationale for punishing organizational membership was that the
crimes committed by groups were more dangerous than those
committed by individuals. The Reich's mass atrocities, for example,
could not have occurred absent criminal combinations that were
cemented by their commitment to a common goal.390
The Supreme National Tribunal, in the March 1947 trial of
Ludwik Fischer, former governor of Warsaw, and his assistant,
Ludwik Leist, declared that the occupation government of the
Government General of Poland was a criminal group. This
criminality was based on the occupation government's aspirations
and activities. The Court noted that Hitler had adopted the view that
the Polish State had ceased to exist, and that the Reich was therefore
unrestrained by the limitations imposed on an occupying power
under international law. Germany proceeded to implement a series
of genocidal policies that resulted in the death or disappearance of
close to seven million residents of Poland and material losses
387. Id. at 520.
388. Cited and quoted in Trial Of Dr. Joseph Buhler, (Sup. Nat'l Trib., Poland,
June 17th-July 10th, 1948), XIV L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 23, 41 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Buhler]. A
criminal organization is defined as a group or organization that has as its aims
the commission of crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity;
or which while having a different aim, tries to attain it through the commission
of such acts. Article Four specifically mentioned the Nazi Party, S.S. (Security
Detachments), State Secret Police (Gestapo) and Security Service (S.D.). Id.
389. Id. at42 (Notes on the Case).
390. Trial Of Ludwik Fischer And Ludwik Leist, (Sup. Nat'l Trib. Poland, March
3rd, 1947) discussed in Buhler, supra note 388, at 42-44 (Notes on the Case).
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amounting to many millions of dollars.39
The scope of this criminality extended from the top leadership
to the heads of county and town districts, thereby encompassing
several hundred persons. Those who voluntarily performed their
tasks while being conscious of the occupation government's aims
and activities were considered criminally culpable. These
individuals were deemed to have been knowingly involved in
implementing the Nazi Party's ideological aspirations, and could not
credibly claim that they had acted in response to superior orders.392
Joseph Buhler was deputy to Hans Frank, Governor of the
Government General. Buhler, along with Frank, was responsible for
implementing the repressive regime in central and southern Poland.
The Supreme National Tribunal noted that he "regularly took part in
the meetings of the Government General's cabinet, and in drafting
and approving laws and orders, especially those which resulted in
deportation, persecution, and extermination of people, and had a
detailed knowledge of how all these measures were being put into
practice. 393  Buhler prepared all legal measures bearing Frank's
signature.
[He] was a type of war criminal who did not directly
commit any common crime himself, but one who
sitting... in his cabinet office, took part in... war
crimes and crimes against humanity... he was the
chief engineer of the complicated and widespread
criminal machinery, who guided thousands of the
willing tools in how to use it.3
94
Buhler personally endorsed and drafted the directives and
instructions for the deportation of Jews from the Reich to Poland. He
391. Id. at45 (Notes onthe Case).
392. Id. at 42-45 and 48 (Notes on the Case). This group included the central
office of the Government General; the district-governors and their deputies; the
heads of departments and sections in the district-govemors' offices; and the heads
of subordinate districts. Id at 44.
393. Id at 34.
394. Id at 35.
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also signed over one hundred orders establishing the death penalty
for a range of innocuous offenses, such as the use of an automobile
or motorcycle. Other directives provided for the extermination of
intellectuals, compulsory work for Poles, the removal of art and
scientific equipment, and a prohibition on district-governors
mitigating the death sentences of Jews apprehended while escaping
from the ghetto. As a result of these policies, thousands of innocents
lost their lives or were put to death or punished for acts that were
legal under both Polish and international law.395
The Tribunal noted that the criminal nature of the
administration of the Government-General already had been
established in the trial of Ludwik Fischer. There could be no doubt
that considering Buhler's high position that he possessed "perfect
knowledge of the criminal aims" of the German occupation
authorities.396 He was adjudged guilty of criminal membership and
deemed responsible for formulating, instigating, and carrying out a
criminal plan and conspiracy. In addition, he was held vicariously
liable for those criminal acts committed by his subordinates in
furtherance of this scheme.397
The Supreme National Tribunal also went beyond Nuremberg
in declaring that the administration and garrison of the Auschwitz
concentration camp was a criminal group. This was based on the
determination that the camp had been established with the aim of
unlawfully depriving individuals of freedom, health, property, and
life based upon their religion or political conviction. Many involved
in the vast web of the camp's administration were directly and
indirectly implicated in a wide compass of clear criminality, but
were not members of an organization declared criminal at
Nuremberg. The Supreme Tribunal's declaration was influenced by
the realization that subjecting these individuals to separate trials
would involve inordinate time and resources.39
395. Id at 36-38.
396. Id at 45 (Notes on the Case).
397. Id (Notes on the Case).
398. Hoess, supra note 47, at 20-21 (Notes on the Case) discussing Trial Of
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The Commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess, also was
convicted of membership in the SS, a criminal organization, which
was allegedly engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity.399
In addition, Hoess was charged with membership in the Nazi Party
that was described as having engaged in "planning, organizing, and
perpetrating crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity."4  Hoess was acquitted of membership in the latter
organization based on the fact that the Polish statute limited liability
to those staffing "all leading positions.""
British tribunals relied upon Regulation 8(ii). This provided
that in those instances in which a war crime resulted from the
concerted action of a unit or group, that evidence against any
member of such unit or group may be considered as prima facie
evidence of the responsibility of other members. Individuals charged
with such an offense were not permitted to sever their trial from the
Artur Liebehenschel. The organization of the camp was considered to encompass
the authorities, administration, and personnel. Those inmates assisting the
Germans were acquitted since they were not members of the criminal
organization--they were not voluntarily bound together by the common aim to
commit crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not rule on the
criminal nature of the administration of prison camps. The Tribunal's judgment
nevertheless included numerous references to the Nazi Party's reliance on the
camps to exterminate political opponents and racial inferiors. Id. at 21-22 (Notes
on the Case).
399. Id. at 18-19 (Notes on the Case).
400. Id. The Nuremberg Tribunal held that the Nazi Party was engaged in war
crimes and crimes against humanity connected with war. The indictment in Goeth
described the Nazi Party as aiming "through violence, aggressive wars and other
crimes, at world domination and establishment of the National Socialist regime."
Goeth, supra note 278, at 5-6 (Notes on the Case).
401. Hoess, supra note 47, at 19. Those offices that were considered as criminal
were those leading ranks and positions enumerated in the Nuremberg judgment.
Id The Supreme National Tribunal made no finding in regards to Goeth since the
prosecution preceded the Nuremberg prosecution. Goeth, supra note 278, at 6-7.
Greiser, however, was convicted of membership in the Nazi Party based on the
provisions of the Nuremberg Charter and the articles in the Polish domestic
criminal code prohibiting conspiracies to commit a hostile act against the Polish
State. Greiser, supra note 290, at 107-08 (Notes on the Case).
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other accused. °2
Each defendant in the Belsen trial was charged with personal as
well as collective acts of criminality. A defendant's delicts
constituted individual criminal conduct, as well as evidence of
collective criminality. Mere involvement in the administration at
Auschwitz was not sufficient to establish criminality. The defense
and prosecution agreed that it must be established that an accused
knowingly participated in a common plan to ill-treat prisoners.
Proof of a conspiracy could be deduced from the acts of an accused,
and there was no requirement that an individual was aware of the
identity of the other participants in the conspiratorial design. Neither
the insignificance of an individual's role nor the fact that an accused
joined an ongoing scheme and was not involved in its origination
constituted a defense. However, the extent of an individual's
involvement and knowledge did bear upon the degree of their
culpability and punishment. The notes to the case illustrate the
principles involved by observing that an individual taking part in
selection parades for the crematorium, knowing their purpose would
be complicit in homicide.4 °3
Forty defendants were convicted by an American Military
Court in the Dachau Concentration Camp case of acting in
pursuance of a common design to kill, beat, torture, starve, and abuse
inmates of the camp. The prosecution established that the accused
aided, abetted, or participated in a plan to commit these crimes
against prisoners. The defendants' complicity in this system was
established through the character of their office or conduct.0 4
Thus, the fact that an accused held the position of Deputy
Camp Commandant or Regimental Sergeant Major was sufficient to
result in the imposition of liability. On the other hand, in the case of
402. Regulation 8(ii), British Royal Warrant, Army Order 81/1045,, quoted and
cited in Belsen, supra note 55, at 138 (Notes on the Case).
403. Id at 139 (Notes on the Case).
404. Trial Of Martin Gottfried Weiss And Thirty-Nine Others, (The Dachau
Concentration Camp Trial) (Gen. Milit. Gov. Ct., United States, Nov. 15th-Dec.
13th, 1943), XI L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 5, 13 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case) [hereinafter Martin Weiss].
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an accused who was in charge of the bath or laundry, the prosecution
was compelled to establish that the defendant carried out their
responsibility in an illicit fashion. The Tribunal broadly interpreted
the scope of culpability to include guards who were deployed to
prevent escape from the camp, as well as prisoner functionaries who
worked on behalf of the camp administration. An accused's
punishment varied with the degree of their participation--sentences
ranged from five years hard labor to death.4"5 The notes to the case
conclude that Dachau
seems to have established a rule that membership of
the staff of a concentration camp raises a
presumption that the accused has committed a war
crime. This presumption may . . . be rebutted by
showing that the accused's membership was of such
short duration or his position of such insignificance
that he could not be said to have participated in the
common design.0 6
In sum, the International Military Tribunal's declarations of
organizational criminality were intended to expedite individual
prosecutions before domestic courts. An individual who was a
knowing and voluntary member of such an organization was liable
for criminal membership. The criminal nature of an organization
was binding on courts in subsequent prosecutions. However, the
prosecution possessed the burden of establishing the accused's
knowledge of the organization's criminal character.40 7  The
underlying philosophy was that such collective conduct posed a
greater danger than acts of individual criminality." 8
The theory of organizational criminality obviated the
requirement that the prosecution demonstrate an explicit or implicit
405. Id at 13-14 (Notes on the Case).
406. Id. at 15-16 (Notes on the Case).
407. See supra notes 382-87 and accompanying texts.
408. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
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agreement among the defendants to pursue a common design or
plan. The scope of liability was circumscribed by the contours of the
organization. All of those who were aware of an organization's
criminal purpose, who nevertheless remained or entered the
organization, were vicariously liable. This was intended to facilitate
the prosecution of large numbers without the burden of establishing
individual criminality.40
9
The Polish Decree of August 31, 1944, authorized the Supreme
National Tribunal to extend the scope of organizational criminality
beyond the precedent established at Nuremberg.41 ° The Tribunal
adjudged that the higher and mid-level echelon of the German
occupation government constituted a criminal organization a.4 1  This
resulted in the imposition of personal and vicarious criminal liability
on Joseph Buhler.412
The Supreme National Tribunal also issued a declaration of
criminality against the administration and garrison of the Auschwitz
concentration camp.41' A British Military Court imposed collective
liability on the staff of the Belsen concentration camp,414 while an
American court determined that those acting in concert at Dachau
were criminally culpable. 5 The British and American courts
created a presumption that those who participated in the
administration of the camps were involved in a common plan to
commit war crimes.416 Most domestic legislation did not provide for
the crime of membership. More typical was the provision adopted in
409. See supra notes 382-90 and accompanying texts.
410. See supra notes 388-89 and accompanying texts.
411. See supra notes 391-92 and accompanying texts.
412. See supra notes 393-397 and accompanying texts.
413. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 402-03 and accompanying texts.
415. See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying texts.
416. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions such as the Netherlands East Indies. These provisions
provided that a war crime which is committed within the framework
of the activities of a group of persons in such a way that the crime
can be ascribed to the group as a whole417 may result in the
attribution of criminal liability to each participant. Thus, once
collective criminality was established, a crime committed by one
member of the group was ascribed to the others.
418
L. Property Offenses
Several French prosecutions addressed the nature and scope of
property offenses under the humanitarian law of war. The Hague
Convention requires an occupying power to respect "[f]amily honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property." 19 Pillage is
specifically prohibited.420 Requisitions in-kind and services may be
demanded to meet the needs of the army of occupation. These
confiscations shall be proportionate to the resources of the country
and may not involve inhabitants in military operations against their
own nation.42' The property of municipalities and religious,
charitable, and educational institutions are to be treated as private
property. The seizure or destruction of this property, as well as
historic monuments and works of art and science, is prohibited.422
417. Trial Of Shigeki Motomura And 15 Others, (Netherlands Temporary Court-
Martia At Macassar, July 18th, 1947), XIII L. REPORT. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
138, 141 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes on the Case).
418. Id at 141-42 (Notes on the Case). Some jurisdictions provided for a
reversal of the burden of proof once the initial concerted crime was established.
Id.
419. Convention (No. IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land,
With Annex Of Regulations, Oct. 19, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
420. Id. at art. 47.
421. Id at art. 52.
422. Id. at art. 56. The so-called Martens Clause in the Preamble extends the
scope of the Convention. The Clause provides that:
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The war crimes provision of the Nuremberg Charter capsulates these
prohibitions and forbids the "plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction .. . or devastation not justified by military
necessity. '
S.S. Obersturmfuehrer Philippe Rust was charged with
"abusive and illegal requisitioning... [of French property and] ...
employing French subjects on military works."' 24 It was alleged that
in September 1944, Rust compelled several French civilians to
provide horses and vehicles to transport munitions. These
individuals were also ordered to repair military bicycles,
motorcycles, and electrical installations. Rust failed to issue
receipts, which effectively resulted in the confiscating of the goods
and labor without payment. The Court convicted Rust of abusing his
powers, but dismissed the charges of pillage and deploying civilians
on military matters. The Tribunal presumably determined that the
requisitions were for the needs of the army of occupation, and were
in proportion to the resources of the occupied territory. In addition,
the Tribunal found that the individuals were not required to
participate in military operations against France. The decision,
however, failed to elucidate these standards. For instance, there is
little clarification of the scope of the prohibition on civilian
involvement in military operations against their own country.425
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that,
in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
Id at preamble.
423. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(b).
424. Trial Of Philippe Rust (Perm. Milit. Trib. at Metz, March 5th, 1948), IX L.
REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 71 (U.N. War Crim. Comm'n, 1949).
425. Id at 71, 72-74 (Notes On The Nature Of The Offence). "The offense for
which the accused was found guilty eventually amounted to a case of 'illegal'
requisitioning, that of violating the requirements according to which, unless
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Hans Szabados, a German officer assigned to a Police
Regiment in occupied France, was convicted of participating in the
execution of hostages, as well as the pillage, immolation, and
bombing of homes and hamlets in retribution for the ambush
shooting of German combatants.426 Article 23(g) of the Hague
Regulations prohibits the destruction or seizure of enemy property,
unless "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.' 427 The
French Court appeared to determine that this provision excuses
incidental destruction of property during active military operations,
but does not permit demolition that is not related to an armed
attack.42
8
German civilian Karl Lingenfelder settled in occupied France
on a farm that had been confiscated by Nazi authorities. He
subsequently pulled down a monument to Allied soldiers killed in
World War I and broke a statue of Joan of Arc. Lingenfelder also
removed horses and vehicles to Germany. As a result of being
convicted of the destruction of public monuments and theft, he was
sentenced to one year in prison. The theft conviction was based on
the fact that the French military code required that pillage involve
force or violence.2 9 In Boomer, a German couple was convicted of
the theft of furniture, horses, jewelry, linens, and money belonging
to a deported French family. The Boomer's children were charged
and convicted of receiving stolen property.430
payment is made 'in ready money,' a receipt is to be given in respect of the objects
requisitioned." Id. at 74.
426. Trial Of Hans Szabados (Penn. Milit. Trib. Clermont-Ferrand, June 23,
1946), IX LAW REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 59-60 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1949).
427. Id at 61 citing and quoting Hague Convention, supra note 61, at art. 23(g).
428. Id at 59-60. The French Tribunal presumably determined that Szabados'
acts of retribution were not limited to those thought to be responsible for the
shootings and did not constitute lawful reprisals. Id at 60.
429. Trial Of Karl Lingenfelder, (Penn Military Trib., Metz, March 11th, 1947)
IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 67-8 (1949).
430. Trial Of Alois And Anna Bommer And Their Daughters (Penn. Milt.
Tribunal at Metz, Feb. 19, 1947), IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 62 (U.N.
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Christian Baus, a German transport contractor, managed
numerous French farms. He sent various objects to Germany which
he had stolen or which had been loaned to him. He was
subsequently convicted of theft and pillage. The pillage count was
based on Baus' abuse of confidence in appropriating the goods lent
to him. He was sentenced to the penalty specified for abuse of
confidence under French law. This suggests that the Court was
treating abuse of confidence as an independent crime punishable
under the Martens Clause of the Hague Convention.43
Rust and Szabados are consistent with the obligation of an
occupying power to respect and safeguard private property. Both,
however, failed to clarify central concepts. How are requisitions to
be calibrated to the resources of the country? At what point are
inhabitants involved in military operations against their own
country? When does military necessity permit the incidental
destruction of property?'32
Ligenfelder affirmed that an occupying power must respect
historic monuments and, along with Boomer and Baus, established
War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Boomer]. Boomer also established that
minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are liable for war crimes,
although their punishment may be mitigated. The Court was authorized to utilize
its discretionary power to free one of the Boomer's daughters who was under the
age of sixteen from legal responsibility. Id. at 66.
431. Trial Of Christian Baus, (Perm. Milit. Trib. at Metz, Aug. 21st, 1947), IX L.
REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 68 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949). Under the
French Suppression of War Crimes Ordinance of August 28, 1944, the removal of
French property from France in time of war as a result of theft, abuse of
confidence or any other act was treated as pillage. Misappropriation by abuse of
confidence was a domestic crime regardless of whether the property was removed
from France. The Court apparently adopted the view that misappropriation by
abuse of confidence was an independent war crime punishable under the Martens
Clause of the Hague Convention. As a result, Baus received the penalty for this
offense under domestic law rather than for pillage under French war crimes
legislation. The Court presumably would have held Baus liable even if he had not
removed the property from France. The Tribunal's focus on misappropriation
seems to reflect the Continental tradition of attempting to calibrate war crimes with
the requirements of domestic law. Id. at 70 (Notes on the Nature of the Offense).
432. See supra notes 424-28 and accompanying texts.
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that civilians are liable for war crimes."' The French courts also
broadly interpreted the Hague Convention to correspond with the
requirements of the relevant French criminal statutes. The
Convention does not explicitly condemn the receipt of stolen
property or abuse of confidence. But, the French tribunals, in
accordance with the so-called Martens Clause, read the Hague
Convention's prohibitions on theft and pillage in light of the
"principles of the laws of nations derived from the usages
established among civilized peoples. 434
M. Punishment
Domestic war crimes statutes generally provided for a range of
punishments, including, but not limited to death, imprisonment
ranging from years to life, confiscation of property, and fines.435
Some legislation provided for additional penalties, including
restitution and a loss of civil rights.436 Combinations of these
penalties were usually imposed upon defendants. For instance,
defendant Joseph Buhler was sentenced to death, as well as to the
loss of public and civil rights, and the forfeiture of property.437
Courts generally expressed little sympathy for those who
perpetrated war crimes. The Netherlands Court of Cassation, in
affirming defendant Hans Rauter's death sentence, noted that Rauter
had flouted the integrity of Netherlands law as well as the "sense of
justice of the community of Nations, which sense has been most
deeply shocked .. ..438 Rauter's detention and deportation of Jews
433. See supra notes 428-431 and accompanying texts.
434. See supra notes 430-31 and accompanying texts. Hague Convention, supra
note 61, at Preamble. See also id at art. 47, 52, 53, 56.
435. See Canadian Law, supra note 8, at 129-30.
436. See Polish Law, supra note 24, at 88; United States Law, supra note 12, at
120.
437. Buhler, supra note 388, at 39.
438. Ranter, supra note 33, at 109.
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and slave laborers, pillage and confiscation of property, and reprisals
against innocents "betray... a reprehensible mentality bereft ... of
every conception of right or morality, and... did... bring with
them serious results for innumerable victims of the reign of
terror." '439 The Court refused to mitigate Rauter's sentence on the
grounds that he had been motivated by patriotic zeal. Rauter
certainly was aware that even such lofty motives neither license the
criminal conduct of armed conflict nor the use of terrorism against
the inhabitants of occupied territories."0
The Tribunal was particularly troubled by Rauter's concession
that, despite his professed innocence, the Netherlands was entitled to
seek retribution. His willingness to believe that the Netherlands
would prosecute and punish an innocent, according to the Court,
revealed the type of immoral and instrumental mentality that
characterized the Nazi regime."'
Courts were willing to recognize a lack of criminal intent as an
extenuating circumstance. The Netherlands Special Court in
Amsterdam sentenced prison warden Willy Zuehlke to only five
years in prison for illegally detaining and mistreating Jewish and
other prisoners. The Court explained that these plans did not
originate with the accused. Zuehlke "stupidly allowed himself to be
carried along with the criminal stream of German terrorism, rather
than acted with intent on his own initiative." 2 The panel stressed
that the prisoners had not been seriously injured, and that the
accused had lacked criminal intent. The accused's acts had been
motivated by his rough nature rather than by a "desire to attack his
victims. ' 4
3
Similarly, defendant Wilhelm Gerbsch was convicted of
439. Id. at 110.
440. Id
441. Id. at 111.
442. Zuehlke, supra note 38, at 141. The Court of Cassation later reduced his
seven-year sentence to five years in prison. Id. at 143.
443. Id. at 141
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abusing concentration camp inmates in Germany. Netherlands law
permitted an enhanced penalty for those who utilized their office to
commit criminal offenses. But, Gerbsch was sentenced to fifteen
years in prison on the grounds that he had not acted on his own
initiative, and rather had been drawn into "the whole abominable
system of terrorism and brutality carried out under the higher
German Nazi administration against civilians of the occupied
nations.' 44 The Court noted that this, in part, might have resulted
from the defendant's defective mental faculties." 5
A French Court, in Wagner, considered Wagner's firing of two
warning shots prior to killing an escaping worker as an extenuating
circumstance that merited reducing his sentence to fifteen years
imprisonment.446  A Netherlands Court-Martial, in sentencing
Lieutenant Tanable Koshiro to five years imprisonment, determined
that Kohsiro did not intend to subject prisoners of war to the danger
of an Allied attack in putting them to work loading an ammunition
depot. Instead, Koshiro's intent was to safeguard his forces' combat
supplies.447
Defendant Johannes Oenning was involved in the killing of a
British Royal Air Force Officer and was sentenced to eight years in
prison. The Court explained that this lenient sentence was based on
the fact that the fifteen year old lacked the capacity to comprehend
the criminality of his actions because he had grown up under the
444. Gerbsch, supra note 41, at 132.
445. Id The Court was authorized to augment by one-third the punishment of
individuals such as Gerbsch who utilized the power of their office to commit a
crime. Id at 137 (Notes on the Case).
446. Wagner II, supra note 92, at 119 (Notes on the Case). The Court also
determined that the victim was cornered between the wall and the railing of the
factory. As a result, Wagner possessed the discretion whether to utilize deadly
force to prevent the victim's escape. Id. (Notes on the Case). Nevertheless, the
Court also took into consideration as an extenuating circumstance that Wagner, as
a factory guard, was not positioned to distinguish between those individuals who
were lawfully detained and those, such as the deceased, who were being
unlawfully detained. Id at 120 (Notes on the Case).
447. Koshiro, supra note 236, at 4.
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Reich regime and had been socialized into the Nazi ideology.448
Juveniles generally received lenient treatment. The two sixteen
year-old defendants in Boomer were sentenced to eighteen months
imprisonment for receiving stolen property while the third, who was
under sixteen, was acquitted on the grounds that she lacked the
capacity to form a criminal intent.449
In most cases, courts refused to recognize mitigating
circumstances. A Norwegian Court rejected Gerhard's Flesch's plea,
in mitigation to his death sentence, that the prisoners whose
execution had been ordered by Flesch may possibly have been
sentenced to death by a legally convened court.45° Defendant Artur
Greiser attempted to mitigate his genocidal acts by pointing to the
benevolent treatment he extended to his Polish house staff. The
Polish National Tribunal noted that such duality was not unusual
among the Nazi leadership and that there was no evidence that
Greiser's benevolence extended beyond the private sphere. As a
result, the Tribunal failed to find that this "good natured and correct
attitude" mitigated the severity of the Greiser's crimes.45'
Defendant Karl Amberger was convicted and sentenced to
death for having ordered the execution of Allied prisoners. A British
Military Court refused to take into account the defendant's previous
record as a brave and responsible soldier. The Court also did not
consider Amberger's belief that the airmen had been responsible for
an attack in which forty civilians were killed as a mitigating
circumstance.452
The Norwegian Court of Appeals, in Bruns, refused to reduce
448. Oenning, supra note 276, at 75.
449. Bommer, supra note 430, at 66 (Notes on the Case). The French penal code
provided that minors between the ages of thirteen and eighteen could be
reprimanded, committed to the care of their parents or criminally punished. Id.
(Notes on the Case).
450. Flesch, supra note 126, at 120. The Tribunal notes that Flesch was
responsible for denying the executed Norwegians a proper trial. Id.
451. Greiser, supra note 290, at 106.
452. Amberger, supra note 232, at 84.
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the defendants' punishment for acts of torture based upon
extenuating circumstances. Defendant Richard Bruns pointed to
various incidents in which he had assisted Norwegians, Rudolf
Schubert pled difficulties at home and Emil Clemens pointed to




Scholarly discussions of World War II war crimes trials have
concentrated on Nuremberg and other major trials. Yet, most
prosecutions occurred before domestic, civilian, or military
tribunals. 4 4  A review of these trials reveals that most involved
minor and modest delicts.4 "5
Why was this the case? Most major war criminals either had
fled or already had been detained or sheltered by the occupying
powers. The Allied Powers were also likely to be reluctant to
accelerate post-war animosities by initiating high-profile
prosecutions. This was encouraged by the fact that West Germany
was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. In addition,
the demands of post-war reconstruction left little energy or resources
to devote to the trial of war criminals. The wisdom of this strategy,
in retrospect, is open to question. The lingering legacy of World
War II is partially due to the fact that full retribution was not
achieved.456
The list of domestic defendants is conspicuous for the absence
of those mid-level bureaucrats and military officials who
implemented German occupation policies.4" There was also a
453. Bruns, supra note 82, at 18.
454. See supra notes 2-39 and accompanying texts.
455. See supra notes 419-33 and accompanying texts. These property cases
are conspicuous for the relatively minor nature of the offenses involved. Id
456. See generally Lippman, The Denaturalization Of Nazi War Criminals In
The United States: Is Justice Being Served? supra note 1.
457. But see supra notes 393-97 and accompanying texts.
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failure to bring charges for crimes committed during armed combat.
Most of the trials concerned the mistreatment of prisoners of war or
civilians.458 These trials also point to the value of international
prosecutions. There is an unsettling sense that domestic courts
lacked the objectivity, resources, and intellectual aptitudes required
to fully and fairly deliver these judgments. The failure of some
courts to adequately discuss and document their decisions limited the
historical and legal import of the judgments.45 9
The domestic decisions reviewed in this essay nevertheless
made a significant contribution to the corpus of the humanitarian law
of war. The cases on naval460 and land warfare,46' genocide, 462 the
treatment of prisoners of war,463 the liability of judicial officials,464
and property offenses465 are of singular significance in international
jurisprudence. Second sets of judgments provide insight into the
domestic implementation of international doctrine. The latter
include the decisions on jurisdiction,46 6 superior orders,467
reprisals,46 and command responsibility.469
458. But see supra notes 149-193 and accompanying texts.
459. See supra note 419-34 and accompanying texts. French courts, for instance,
provided little explanation for their verdicts. Id
460. See supra notes 149-172 and accompanying texts.
461. See supra notes 173-193 and accompanying texts.
462. See supra notes 278-316 and accompanying texts.
463. See supra notes 214-251 and accompanying texts.
464. See supra notes 317-81 and accompanying texts.
465. See supra notes 419-34 and accompanying texts.
466. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying texts.
467. See supra notes 61-102 and accompanying texts.
468. See supra notes 103-131 and accompanying texts.
469. See supra notes 132-148 and accompanying texts.
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